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INTRODUCTION 
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia,1 the Supreme Court’s 
seminal death penalty case, the Court held that the death 
penalty, as then administered, violated the Eighth 
Amendment because the penalty decision was so unguided, 
and the imposition of the death penalty was so infrequent2 as 
to create an unconstitutional risk of arbitrariness.3  In 1976, 
in Gregg v. Georgia,4 and its companion cases, Proffitt v. 
Florida5 and Jurek v. Texas,6 the Court approved the post-
 
 1.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 2.  The justices assumed that about 15–20% of those who were death-
eligible were sentenced to death. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the four 
dissenters, adopted that statistic. Furman, 408 U.S. at 386 n.11 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting), as did Justice Powell, also writing for the four dissenters.  See id. at 
435 n.19 (Powell, J., dissenting).  Justice Stewart, in turn, cited to the Chief 
Justice’s statement as support for his conclusion that the imposition of death 
was “unusual.”  Id. at 309 n.10.  Post-Furman research confirmed that the pre-
Furman death sentence rate in Georgia was 15%.  See David C. Baldus, et al., 
EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
80 (1990). 
 3.  Although Furman had no majority opinion, and each of the five justices 
in the majority wrote separately, the “holding” came to be seen as embodied in 
the opinions of Justices Stewart and White.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
188 (1976) (plurality opinion). Both justices emphasized that the relatively 
infrequent use of the death penalty created the risk that it would be applied 
arbitrarily, Justice Stewart stating that it was cruel and unusual because it was 
inflicted on “a capriciously selected random handful” of defendants and that it 
was like “being struck by lightning.”  Furman, 408 U.S.  at 309–10, and Justice 
White stating that “the death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for 
the most atrocious crimes and . . . there is no meaningful basis for 
distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in 
which it is not.”  Id. at 313. 
 4.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 5.  Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
 6.  Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
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Furman death penalty schemes of Georgia, Florida and 
Texas, respectively.  In those cases, the Court identified 
several aspects of the schemes that limited the risk of 
arbitrariness, but, in subsequent cases, the Court held that 
Furman was satisfied if the state’s scheme met two 
requirements: (1) the state, by statute, had to “genuinely 
narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty”;7 
and (2) the state scheme had to provide for “meaningful 
appellate review” of death sentences.8  These two 
requirements were intended to implement Furman’s bedrock 
principle, that the death penalty must be imposed “with 
reasonable consistency, or not at all.”9  As Justice Stevens 
explained: 
A constant theme of our cases . . . has been emphasis on 
procedural protections that are intended to ensure that 
the death penalty will be imposed in a consistent, rational 
manner. As stated in Zant [v. Stephens], we have stressed 
the necessity of “generally narrow[ing] the class of persons 
eligible for the death penalty,” and of assuring 
consistently applied appellate review.10 
The Court assumed that the former, “statutory 
narrowing,” requirement would lead to more consistency in 
the administration of the death penalty because the sentencer 
would be exercising discretion within a reduced class of 
murderers who were more deserving of death than the 
“average” murderer.11 
As the types of murders for which the death penalty may 
be imposed become more narrowly defined and are limited 
to those which are particularly serious or for which the 
death penalty is peculiarly appropriate . . . it becomes 
reasonable to expect that juries—even given discretion not 
to impose the death penalty—will impose the death 
penalty in a substantial portion of the cases so defined. If 
they do, it can no longer be said that the penalty is being 
imposed wantonly and freakishly or so infrequently that it 
 
 7.  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). 
 8.  Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991); See infra Part I. 
 9.  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982). 
 10.  Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 876–77). 
 11.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002) “culpability of the average murderer is 
insufficient to justify the most extreme sanction”). 
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loses its usefulness as a sentencing device.12 
This requirement has been the subject of litigation in the 
lower courts,13 including the California Supreme Court,14 and 
has drawn significant attention from death penalty 
scholars.15  This attention may be due to the fact that the 
requirement is quantifiable—the death-eligibility rate (the 
percentage of murderers made death-eligible) and death 
sentence rate (the percentage of death-eligible murderers16 
sentenced to death) are determinable—and therefore subject 
to empirical study.  In fact, the Court’s statement that the 
required statutory narrowing should result in the imposition 
of the death penalty “in a substantial portion of the cases so 
defined” constituted an invitation to determine whether, 
under various state death penalty schemes, the death penalty 
was in fact being imposed in a substantial portion of death-
eligible cases: i.e., to determine the state’s death-sentence 
 
 12.  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327 (1989) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 
222 (White, J. concurring)). 
 13.  See, e.g., McKenzie v. Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1539, 1541(9th Cir. 1988) 
(en banc)(upholding Montana death penalty scheme on basis that only six types 
of deliberate homicide made defendant death-eligible and that aggravated 
kidnapping led to death-eligibility only where victim died as result of 
kidnapping); Andrews v. Shulsen, 802 F.2d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 
1986)(upholding Utah death penalty scheme because at time capital homicide 
was restricted “to intentional or knowing murders committed under eight 
aggravating circumstances”); State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 346–47 
(Tenn. 1992), cert. granted, 507 U.S. 1028, cert. dismissed as improvidently 
granted, 510 U.S. 124 (1993) (upholding failure-to-narrow challenge because of 
broad definition of felony-murder and felony-murder aggravating factor); State 
v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136, 1158 (Or. 1988), vacated and remanded, 492 U.S. 914  
(1989) (rejecting failure-to-narrow challenge because limited number of 
aggravated murders). 
 14.  The court has rejected “failure to narrow” challenges in scores of cases, 
all without consideration of empirical evidence on the issue.  See, e.g., People v. 
Cook, 139 P.3d 492, 529 (Cal. 2006); People v. Boyette, 58 P.3d 391, 428–29 
(2002). 
 15.  The most recent and thorough discussion of the narrowing requirement 
appears in Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau,Waking the Furman Giant, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 981 (2015).  See also James S. Liebman, Slow Dancing with 
Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment 1963–2006, 107 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (2007); Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty 
Scheme: Requiem for Furman? 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283 (1997). 
 16.  I refer to defendants committing murders falling within the statutorily 
narrowed class as “death-eligible.”  This is the sense in which the Supreme 
Court has used the term in distinguishing between the “eligibility” decision 
(whether the defendant committed a murder with an aggravating factor, as 
defined by statute) and the “selection” decision.  See Tuilaepa v. California, 512 
U.S. 967, 971–73 (1994). 
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rate.  A number of researchers have accepted the invitation 
and published their findings on state death-sentence rates.17 
By contrast, there has been little litigation in the lower 
courts about the requirement of meaningful appellate review, 
and most of the  literature on the issue discusses the need for 
comparative intercase proportionality review and/or the 
methodology of such review.18  The present Article examines 
the Supreme Court’s understanding of the meaningful 
appellate review requirement and tests that requirement 
against the California death penalty scheme.  Part I reviews 
the Supreme Court law on meaningful appellate review, 
using as a framework the Court’s distinction in Pulley v. 
Harris19 between two types of proportionality review, referred 
to here as: (1) “comparative proportionality review,” where a 
state court reviews the proportionality of a death sentence by 
comparing the sentence with the sentences in other similar 
cases20; and (2) “individual proportionality review,” where a 
state court reviews a death sentence for disproportionality, 
excessiveness or inappropriateness without considering 
sentences in other cases.  Part II describes the California 
death penalty scheme and the California Supreme Court’s 
review of death sentences.  Part III examines whether the 
California death penalty scheme is “so lacking in other checks 
on arbitrariness” that comparative proportionality review is 
 
 17.  See, e.g., Justin Marceau, Sam Kamin & Wanda Foglia, Death 
Eligibility in Colorado: Many Are Called, Few Are Chosen, 84 U. COLO. L. 
REV.1069 (2013) (Colorado: database of 539 death-eligible homicides, death 
sentence rate of 0.56%); Steven F. Shatz & Naomi R. Shatz, Chivalry is not 
Dead: Murder, Gender, and the Death Penalty, 27 BERKELEY J. OF GEN., LAW & 
JUSTICE 64 (2012) (California: database of 1299 convicted first degree 
murderers, death sentence rate of 5.5%); John J. Donohue III, An Empirical 
Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There 
Unlawful Racial, Gender, and Geographic Disparities? 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 637, 638 (2014) (Connecticut: 205 death-eligible homicides, death 
sentence rate 4.4%). 
 18.  See, e.g., William W. Berry, III, Practicing Proportionality, 64 FLA. L. 
REV. 687 (2012); Bidish J. Sarma , Robert J. Smith & Ben G. Cohen, Struck by 
Lightning: Walker v. Georgia and Louisiana’s Proportionality Review of Death 
Sentences, 37 S.U.L. L. REV. 65 (2009); Penny J. White, Can Lightning Strike 
Twice?  Obligations of State Courts after Pulley v. Harris, 70 COLO. L. REV. 813 
(1999). 
 19.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
 20.  This intercase comparative proportionality review should be 
distinguished from what might be termed “intracase comparative 
proportionality review,” the comparison of a defendant’s sentence with the 
sentences received by co-participants in the crime. 
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required under Pulley.21  Part IV addresses how a state court 
might develop standards for individual proportionality review 
and contrasts that approach with the actual performance of 
the California Supreme Court.  The Conclusion argues that, 
in the last twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has paid 
insufficient attention to its foundational death penalty 
jurisprudence, with the result that, as demonstrated by 
California, the states have been free to ignore Furman and to 
administer death penalty schemes no less arbitrary than the 
Georgia scheme that was held unconstitutional more than 
forty years ago.22 
I. THE SUPREME COURT AND “MEANINGFUL APPELLATE 
REVIEW” 
Unlike the narrowing requirement, which was explained 
in Zant v. Stephens,23 the requirement of “meaningful 
appellate review” emerged over time and in a series of cases.  
Part A describes the development of the requirement and its 
rationale.  Part B examines the three cases in which the 
Supreme Court has addressed challenges to death sentences 
based on the requirement. 
A. The Requirement of Meaningful Appellate Review of 
Death Sentences 
In all three of the 1976 cases where the Supreme Court 
upheld the state’s death penalty scheme, the plurality cited 
with approval the scheme’s provisions for review.  In Gregg v. 
Georgia,24 the plurality referred to “meaningful appellate 
review” as a “further safeguard” against arbitrary death 
sentences.25  In Proffitt v. Florida,26 the plurality said of the 
Florida Supreme Court’s comparative proportionality review: 
 
 21.  See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 51. 
 22.  Throughout this Article, to avoid the awkwardness of the “he/she” 
formulation, I refer to death-sentenced defendants with male pronouns.  
Nationally, more than 98% of death-sentenced defendants are men, and the 
defendants in every case cited in this Article were men. 
 23.  See Zant, 462 U.S. at 877. 
 24.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 25.  Id. at 195; Id. at 206 (Georgia’s comparative proportionality review 
“substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die 
by the action of an aberrant jury”). 
 26.  Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
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[T]he Florida statute has a provision designed to assure 
that the death penalty will not be imposed on a 
capriciously selected group of convicted defendants. The 
Supreme Court of Florida reviews each death sentence to 
ensure that similar results are reached in similar 
cases. . . . [I]t is apparent that the Florida court has 
undertaken responsibly to perform its function of death 
sentence review with a maximum of rationality and 
consistency.27 
In Jurek v. Texas,28 concerning the Texas scheme, which did 
not provide for comparative review, the plurality said: 
By providing prompt judicial review of the jury’s decision 
in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided 
a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and 
consistent imposition of death sentences under law.29 
Though in these cases the plurality did not specify which 
elements of the three death penalty schemes were 
constitutionally required, its emphasis on the importance of 
meaningful appellate review suggested that the justices 
might come to see such review as essential.30 
In subsequent cases, the Court either assumed or stated 
that meaningful appellate review was required in capital 
cases.  In Barclay v. Florida,31 Justice Stevens, in a 
concurring opinion reflecting the “holding” of the Court,32 
addressed (and rejected on the merits) the defendant’s 
contention that the Florida Supreme Court had failed to 
 
 27.  Id. at 258–59. 
 28.  Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
 29.  Id. at 276. 
 30.  By contrast, in the other two companion cases, Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976), the 
Court struck down the state schemes and observed that they did not provide for 
“meaningful appellate review of the jury’s decision.”  Id. at 335–36. In his 
dissenting opinion in Woodson, Justice Rehnquist responded criticizing the 
plurality’s “praise of appellate review as a cure for the constitutional 
infirmities” and asserting that “surely” such review was not constitutionally 
required. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 318–19. 
 31.  Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983), discussed infra at note 33. 
 32.  See United States v. Marks, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (“When a 
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the 
narrowest grounds.’ ” ) quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) 
(plurality opinion). 
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provide meaningful appellate review.33  In Pulley v. Harris,34 
the majority, while rejecting the defendant’s claim that 
California Supreme Court was required to engage in 
comparative proportionality review of death sentences, 
seemed to assume that “some form of meaningful appellate 
review is required.”35  In his concurring opinion, Justice 
Stevens made this assumption explicit: 
While we did not hold [in Zant v. Stephens36] that 
comparative proportionality review is a mandated 
component of a constitutionally acceptable capital 
sentencing system, our decision certainly recognized what 
was plain from Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek: that some form 
of meaningful appellate review is an essential safeguard 
against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of death 
sentences by individual juries and judges.37 
Finally, in Parker v. Dugger,38 the Court granted relief to a 
defendant because the state supreme court had failed to 
conduct meaningful appellate review of his death sentence.  
The state courts have understood these cases to hold that the 
Eighth Amendment requires “meaningful appellate review” of 
death sentences,39 as have the commentators.40 
 
 33.  Barclay, 463 U.S. at 972–74. 
 34.  See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
 35.  Id. at 45. 
 36.  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
 37.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 59. Later, writing for the four dissenters in 
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), Justice Stevens explained why the 
Eighth Amendment required that states conduct “meaningful appellate review” 
of death judgments: 
The unique nature of the death penalty not only necessitates additional 
protections during pretrial, guilt, and sentencing phases, but also 
enhances the importance of the appellate process.  Generally there is 
no constitutional right to appeal a conviction. [citation] “[M]eaningful 
appellate review” in capital cases, however, “serves as a check against 
the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.” Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195, 206 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell and 
Stevens, JJ.).  It is therefore an integral component of a State’s 
“constitutional responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner 
that avoids the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty.” 
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980). Id. at 22–23. 
 38.  Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321–23 (1991). 
 39.  See, e.g., State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1348 (Conn. App. 1994) (“The 
eighth amendment’s mandate that the death penalty may only be imposed in a 
manner that is consistent and reliable also imposes other conditions on the 
validity of a death penalty statute. . . . [T]o provide a check against having a 
death sentence imposed under the influence of passion or prejudice, or in a 
random and arbitrary manner, there must be an opportunity for meaningful 
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The requirement that a state scheme provide for 
meaningful appellate review to promote “reliability and 
consistency” in death judgments41 and to guard against 
arbitrariness and irrationality in the administration of the 
death penalty42 constituted a recognition by the Court that, 
even a scheme with a sufficiently narrowed death-eligible 
class might, given the discretion accorded to prosecutors and 
juries, produce arbitrary results.  What was required then 
was proportionality review of the death sentence, not simply 
review of the guilt or death-eligibility findings.43  That is 
made clear in Parker v. Dugger,44 where the Court said, “It 
cannot be gainsaid that meaningful appellate review requires 
that the appellate court consider the defendant’s actual 
record. ‘What is important . . . is an individualized 
determination on the basis of the character of the individual 
and the circumstances of the crime.’ ”  45  By defining the 
required appellate review in terms of the factors by which the 
sentencer determines the penalty, the Court made clear that 
the state courts must review the death sentence itself.46 
The meaningful appellate review requirement, like the 
 
appellate review.”); State v. Card, 825 P.2d 1081, 1094 (Idaho 1991) 
(“meaningful appellate review” required by decisions of the Supreme Court); 
Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d 536, 610 (Wyo. 2003) (Pulley requires “thoughtful and 
effective appellate review”). 
 40.  See, e.g., Berry, supra, note 18 at 689–90; Louis D. Bilionis & Richard 
A. Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and the Eighth Amendment, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 
1301, 1358, n. 227 (1997). 
 41.  Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 749 (1990). 
 42.  Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. at 321. 
 43.  Logically, “meaningful appellate review” must consist of something 
more than ordinary appellate review for legal error because all states already 
provided for ordinary appellate review of capital cases before Furman, so merely 
stating as a requirement a procedure that was already in place would not 
address the problems identified in Furman. 
 44.  Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991). 
 45.  Id. at 321 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)). 
 46.   See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 749 (1991) (referring to 
meaningful appellate review of death sentences).  The only contrary indication 
comes from a single case cite in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 53 (1984). After 
discussing the statutory requirement that the California Supreme Court review 
the trial judge’s refusal to modify a death verdict “focusing upon the 
circumstances present in each particular case” (quoting People v. Frierson, 599 
P.2d 587, 609 (Cal. 1979)), the Court inexplicably cites as an example of such 
“effective appellate review” People v. Thompson, 611 P.2d 883, 893 (Cal. 1980), 
a case not involving review of the death sentence but of the admissibility of 
evidence used to support the special circumstances (death-eligibility) finding. 
SHATZ FINAL 12/29/2015  1:32 PM 
88 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
genuine narrowing requirement, is a systemic requirement 
aimed at limiting the risk of arbitrariness.  Consequently, the 
defendant asserting that the state court does not conduct 
meaningful appellate review of death sentences does not have 
to prove that his death sentence is in fact arbitrary.  Just as 
the Supreme Court did not inquire whether the death 
sentence in Furman was aberrant or whether Furman could 
have been sentenced to death under a narrower scheme, so, 
too, the question of whether a state provides for meaningful 
appellate review does not turn on the facts of an individual 
case.  Again, as is the case with the “genuine narrowing” 
requirement, the meaningful appellate review requirement 
does not prescribe the standards each state court must apply.  
Just as the states are free to genuinely narrow the death-
eligible class with different aggravating circumstances, the 
state courts are free to adopt different standards for 
determining proportionality so long as they achieve a 
reasonable level of consistency. 
B. “Meaningful Appellate Review” Challenges in the 
Supreme Court: Barclay, Pulley, and Parker 
Although it seems clear that the Eighth Amendment 
requires state courts to engage in meaningful appellate 
review of death sentences and that the purpose of such review 
is to reduce the risk of arbitrariness, it is far from clear what 
constitutes meaningful review, or, more precisely, how the 
Supreme Court is to determine whether the requirement has 
been satisfied.  The Court has decided only three cases where 
the defendant challenged a death sentence on the basis that 
the state failed to provide meaningful appellate review: 
Barclay v. Florida,47 Pulley v. Harris,48 and Parker v. 
Dugger,49 each of which is discussed below. 
 
 47.  Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). 
 48.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
 49.  Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991). More recently, the Court’s 
denial of certiorari in a “meaningful appellate review” challenge provoked an 
exchange between Justices Stevens and Thomas about the requirement.  See 
Walker v. Georgia, 129 S.Ct. 453 (2008) (Stevens, J., statement respecting 
denial of certiorari) and 129 S.Ct. 481 (2008) (Thomas, J., concurring)).  Justice 
Stevens argued that the Georgia Supreme Court had “significantly narrowed” 
its comparative proportionality review since Zant, and he labeled the review in 
the instant case as “utterly perfunctory” stating “the likely result of such a 
truncated review—particularly in conjunction with the remainder of the 
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1. Barclay v. Florida 
The first of the three cases was Barclay v. Florida.  
Barclay and four others participated in a racially motivated 
killing.50  Dougan, the actual shooter, was sentenced to death, 
and the other three were sentenced to prison.51  At Barclay’s 
trial, the jury recommended a life sentence, but the trial 
judge—finding six aggravating factors and no mitigating 
factors (despite Barclay’s introduction of non-statutory 
mitigating evidence)—rejected the jury’s recommendation and 
sentenced Barclay to death.52  The Florida Supreme Court 
affirmed in a brief opinion, finding no error in the trial court’s 
decision.53  In the Supreme Court, Barclay challenged the 
trial judge’s sentencing order as contrary to Florida law and 
unsupported by the facts, and he also challenged the Florida 
Supreme Court’s review as, in effect, rubber-stamping the 
flawed sentencing order.  A fractured Supreme Court rejected 
Barclay’s claims. 
The three principal opinions in the case—Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion for the plurality, Justice Stevens’s 
concurring opinion for himself and Justice Powell and Justice 
Marshall’s dissenting opinion for himself and Justice 
Brennan54—all agreed that the trial court’s sentencing order 
was flawed under state law.  However, on the question 
whether the Florida Supreme Court engaged in meaningful 
appellate review, the justices differed in their analysis.  
Justice Rehnquist saw the question as being one of the state 
 
Georgia scheme, which does not cabin the jury’s discretion in weighing 
aggravating and mitigating factors—is the arbitrary or discriminatory 
imposition of death sentences in contravention of the Eighth Amendment.” 129 
S.Ct. at 455–57. Justice Thomas responded with the assertion that “[t]here is 
nothing constitutionally defective about the Georgia Supreme Court’s 
determination. Proportionality review is not constitutionally required in any 
form.” 129 S.Ct. at 482. While the statement might be read to deny that even 
individual proportionality review is constitutionally required, given the context, 
the statement probably was intended as a reiteration of the holding in Pulley 
that comparative proportionality review was not required. 
 50.  Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion set out the facts in detail, quoting 
the trial judge, as quoted by the Florida Supreme Court. 463 U.S. at 942–44. 
 51.  Id. at 944,  n.1. 
 52.  Barclay v. State, 343 So.2d 1266, 1270–71. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Justice Blackmun dissented with a brief statement.  Barclay v. Florida, 
463 U.S. 939, 991 (1984). 
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court’s application of its own “harmless error” precedents.55  
So stated, the question was one of state law raising no federal 
constitutional question.  Additionally, the decision was 
“buttressed” by the Florida court’s practice of reviewing death 
sentences for excessiveness and the plurality’s understanding 
that the state court “does not apply its harmless-error 
analysis in an automatic or mechanical fashion . . . .”56  In 
dissent, Justice Marshall disagreed with the plurality’s 
premise that the Florida Supreme Court decision was based 
on “harmless error” and would have held the Florida court’s 
“failure . . . to conduct any considered appellate review” 
violated the Constitution.57 
Justice Stevens, whose concurring opinion, as noted 
above, counts as the “holding” of the Court,58 took a middle 
ground between Rehnquist and Marshall.59  Unlike 
Rehnquist, Stevens recognized that a state court’s failure to 
afford meaningful review of a death sentence might be the 
basis of an Eighth Amendment challenge, but unlike 
Marshall, he thought that whether a state court was 
providing meaningful review could not be determined based 
on the results of a single case: “[T]he question is whether, in 
its regular practice, the Florida Supreme Court has become a 
rubber stamp for lower court death-penalty determinations.”60  
Stevens examined the record of the Florida Supreme Court 
and found that, since 1972, the court had affirmed only 120 of 
212 death sentences and had set aside the remainder “with 
instructions either to hold a new sentencing proceeding or to 
impose a life sentence.”61  For Stevens, that record confirmed 
the expectation of the Court, expressed in Proffitt v. Florida,62 
that Florida’s appellate review system would serve to 
minimize the risk that the death penalty would be imposed in 
an arbitrary or capricious manner.63 
 
 55.  Id. at 956–58. 
 56.  Id. at 958. 
 57.  Id. at 987–90. 
 58.  See supra at note 54. 
 59.  Barlcay v. Florida, 463 U.S. at 972–74. 
 60.  Id. at 973. 
 61.  Id.  Justice Stevens does not indicate what portion of these sentence 
reversals were actually based on the court’s proportionality review, rather than 
on a finding of ordinary legal error. 
 62.  Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976). 
 63.  Barclay, 463 U.S. at 974. 
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2. Pulley v. Harris 
In Pulley v. Harris, the defendant challenged California’s 
1977 death penalty law on the ground that it did not provide 
for comparative proportionality review of death sentences.64  
The defendant relied on the fact that, in approving the 
Georgia death penalty scheme in Gregg v. Georgia65 and Zant 
v. Stephens,66 the Court had emphasized the importance of 
Georgia’s requirement of comparative proportionality review 
to prevent arbitrariness.67  The Court rejected defendant’s 
contention, finding that in Gregg and its companion cases the 
plurality had said such review was an “additional safeguard,” 
but had never said such review was constitutionally 
required68 and, in Zant, the Court “relied on the jury’s finding 
of aggravating circumstances, not the State Supreme Court’s 
finding of proportionality as rationalizing the sentence.”69  
Although the Court acknowledged that some form of 
meaningful appellate review was required70 and cited with 
approval Penal Code § 190.4(e) specifying that the trial 
court’s decision not to modify a death sentence “shall be 
reviewed,”71 it held that comparative proportionality review 
(a feature of most states’ death penalty schemes) was not 
required.72  The Court did not spell out what this less robust 
form of death sentence review would look like,73 except that it 
equated meaningful review with prompt review.74 In 
explaining that the Court had not required comparative 
 
 64.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 42 n.5. 
 65.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
 66.  Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983). 
 67.  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 206; Zant, 462 U.S. at 874–75. 
 68.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 50. 
 69.  Id. at 50. 
 70.  Id. at 45. 
 71.  Id. at 53. Quoting this provision might suggest that the Court thought 
review of the death sentence itself was mandatory.  However, the California 
Supreme Court has never treated the review as mandatory, and there was no 
such review of Harris’s sentence.  See People v. Harris, 623 P.2d 240 (Cal. 1981). 
 72.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 43–45. 
 73.  It could be argued that proportionality review without comparison of 
like cases is an oxymoron.  See White, supra note 18 at 834–35 (1999) (“To truly 
determine proportionality, a sentence must be viewed in light of other 
sentences; in other words, it must be compared.”); State v. Fields, 908 P.2d 
1211, 1225 (Idaho, 1995) (finding that the legislature’s elimination of the 
requirement that the supreme court conduct comparative proportionality review 
rendered the requirement that the court review for excessiveness meaningless). 
 74.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 48–49. 
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proportionality review, although both the Georgia and Florida 
schemes provided it, the Court said, “[R]eferences to appellate 
review in Gregg and Proffitt were focused not on 
proportionality review as such, but only on the provision of 
some sort of prompt and automatic appellate review.”75  The 
Court then added the following qualification: 
Assuming that there could be a capital sentencing system 
so lacking in other checks on arbitrariness that it would 
not pass constitutional muster without comparative 
proportionality review, the 1977 California statute is not 
of that sort.76 
The Court repeated this qualification in McCleskey v. Kemp: 
“[W]here the statutory procedures adequately channel the 
sentencer’s discretion, such proportionality review [of similar 
murders] is not constitutionally required.”77  The Court did 
not indicate what such a defective scheme might look like, 
but, as discussed below,78 it might look very much like the 
present California scheme. 
3. Parker v. Dugger 
Parker v. Dugger is the only case where the Court 
appears to have relied on a lack of meaningful appellate 
review to overturn a death sentence.  Parker was convicted of 
two murders by a Florida jury.  At the penalty phase, Parker 
presented substantial, and, in some respects, uncontroverted, 
mitigating evidence.  The jury found aggravating 
circumstances rendering Parker death-eligible, but also found 
that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the 
aggravating circumstances and recommended that he be 
sentenced to life imprisonment.  The trial judge accepted the 
jury’s recommendation as to one murder, but as to the other 
murder he concluded that there were no mitigating 
circumstances that outweighed the aggravating 
circumstances, and he sentenced Parker to death.  On appeal, 
the Florida Supreme Court overturned two of the six 
aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge.  The 
 
 75.  Id. at 49 (emphasis added).  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 211 
(1976) (“Prompt review by the Georgia Supreme Court is provided for in every 
case in which the death penalty is imposed.”) 
 76.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 51. 
 77.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987). 
 78.  See infra at Part II. . 
SHATZ FINAL 12/29/2015  1:32 PM 
2016] MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW 93 
court’s practice was to remand for resentencing when it 
reversed findings as to one or more aggravating 
circumstances and the trial court had found one or more 
mitigating circumstances; however the court found there were 
no mitigating circumstances and affirmed the death sentence. 
The Supreme Court held (5-4) that the Florida court’s 
decision was arbitrary and amounted to a denial of 
meaningful appellate review.79  Rejecting the dissent’s claim 
that the Florida court’s finding of no mitigating 
circumstances was entitled to deference and was a matter of 
state law not subject to review by the Supreme Court,80 the 
majority said: 
We have emphasized repeatedly the crucial role of 
meaningful appellate review in ensuring that the death 
penalty is not imposed arbitrarily or irrationally.  . . . The 
Florida Supreme Court did not conduct an independent 
review here.  In fact, there is a sense in which the court 
did not review Parker’s sentence at all.81 
* * * 
While it seems clear that meaningful appellate review of 
death sentences is a required element of a constitutional 
death penalty scheme, exactly what constitutes meaningful 
appellate review is far less clear.  The three cases where the 
court has considered a challenge to a state court’s review 
provide clues, but none gives a comprehensive explanation of 
the requirement.  This much seems clear.  The Court 
distinguishes between comparative proportionality review 
and individual proportionality review, and believes the 
former is more robust than the latter.  Comparative 
proportionality review is not constitutionally required unless 
the state scheme is lacking in other checks on arbitrariness.  
Meaningful appellate review requires the state court to 
consider the defendant’s mitigation evidence and to weigh it 
in some fashion against the evidence in aggravation.  Except 
where the state court, as in Parker, wholly fails to engage in 
such a process, a meaningful appellate review challenge is a 
systemic challenge and can only be proved by showing that 
the state court, as a rule, does fulfill its review obligations.  
 
 79. Parker v. Duggar, 498 U.S. 301, 321–23. 
 80. See id. at 324–26 (White, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 321. 
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Whether meaningful appellate review, as understood by the 
Supreme Court, has been implemented in state death penalty 
schemes is an open question, as the California experience 
demonstrates. 
II. THE CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY SCHEME AND 
AUTOMATIC REVIEW IN DEATH PENALTY CASES  
California’s 1977 death penalty law, at issue in Pulley v. 
Harris,82 was superseded by the 1978 Briggs Death Penalty 
Initiative,83 which created the scheme currently in effect.  
According to its author State Senator John V. Briggs, the 
initiative was intended to “give Californians the toughest 
death-penalty law in the country.”84  By “the toughest death 
penalty law,” the proponents meant a law “which threatens to 
inflict that penalty on the maximum number of defendants.”85  
That “toughest death penalty law” has since been expanded 
by voter initiatives on three occasions since 1978.86  Because 
the law was enacted by initiative, the legislature has played 
no role in shaping the law, and, with the exception of two 
fairly limited holdings more than thirty years ago,87 the 
California Supreme Court also has taken no role in defining 
its coverage.88 
The California Penal Code starts with an expansive 
definition of first-degree murder in §§ 187-8989 and then, in § 
 
 82.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. at 38 n.1. 
 83.  Initiative Measure Proposition 7 (approved Nov. 7, 1978). 
 84.  Ballot Proposition Analysis and Rundown of Key District Races, CAL. J., 
Nov. 1978, Special Section, at 4–5. 
 85.  Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862, 871 n.13 (Cal. 1983). 
 86.  See Initiative Measure Proposition 115 § 9 (approved June 5, 1990); 
1995 Cal. Stat. 478, enacted by Proposition 196, § 2 (approved Mar. 26, 1996); 
1998 Cal. Stat. 629, enacted by Proposition 18 (approved March 7, 2000); 
Initiative Measure Proposition 21 § 11 (approved March 7, 2000). 
 87.  See People v. Weidert, 705 P.2d 380, 383 (Cal. 1985) (applying the rule 
of People v. Green, 609 P.2d 468, 505–06 (Cal. 1980) that the felony-murder 
special circumstances do not apply when the felony is only “incidental” to the 
killing, a holding partially overturned by a subsequent initiative); People v. 
Superior Court (Engert), 647 P.2d 76, 77–78 (Cal. 1982) (holding 
unconstitutional the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” special circumstance). 
 88.  In 1983, the court in Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862, 869 (Cal. 
1983), interpreted § 190.2 to require proof of intent to kill for a special 
circumstances finding, but less than four years later, that interpretation was 
held to be erroneous and Carlos was overruled in People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 
1306, 1138–39 (Cal. 1987). 
 89.  There are twenty-one categories of first-degree murder. 
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190.2, enumerates thirty-three special circumstances that 
make a first-degree murderer death-eligible (i.e., that make 
the murder “capital murder”).90  According to the California 
Supreme Court, the § 190.2 special circumstances perform 
the “constitutionally required ‘narrowing’ function.”91  
However, this extensive list of special circumstances covers 
almost all forms of first-degree murder because virtually all 
first-degree murders are either premeditated killings or 
felony-murders. Most premeditated murders are capital 
murders under California’s unique lying in wait special 
circumstance92 that makes death-eligible a murderer who 
intentionally kills his victim by surprise and from a position 
of advantage.  As for felony-murder, currently all but one of 
the thirteen felonies (torture) which may be the basis for a 
 
 90.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a).  The section has twenty-two numbered 
special circumstances, one of which (felony-murder) has twelve separate sub-
parts.  The Briggs Initiative had twenty-seven special circumstances, and six 
special circumstances were added by the subsequent initiatives. The thirty-
three current special circumstances may be grouped as follows: 
2 “other murder” circumstances: the defendant was convicted of more 
than one murder ((a)(3)) or was previously convicted of murder ((a)(2)); 
8 “victim” circumstances: the defendant intentionally killed a peace 
officer ((a)(7)), federal law enforcement officer or agent ((a)(8)), 
firefighter ((a)(9)), witness ((a)(10)), prosecutor or former prosecutor 
((a)(11)), judge or former judge ((a)(12)), elected official or former 
elected official ((a)(13)) or juror ((a)(20)); 
6 “manner” circumstances: the murder was committed by a destructive 
device, bomb or explosive planted ((a)(4)) or mailed ((a)(6)) or was 
intentionally committed by lying in wait ((a)(15)), by the infliction of 
torture ((a)(18)), by poison ((a)(19)) or by shooting from a motor vehicle 
((a)(21)); 
4 “motive” circumstances: the defendant committed the murder for 
financial gain ((a)(1)), to escape arrest ((a)(5)), because of the victim’s 
race, color, religion, national origin or country of origin ((a)(16)) or to 
further the activities of a criminal street gang ((a)(22); 
12 “commission of a felony” circumstances: the murder was committed 
while the defendant was engaged in, or an accomplice to robbery 
((a)(17)(A)), kidnapping ((a)(17)(B)), rape ((a)(17)(C)), forcible sodomy 
((a)(17)(D)), child molestation ((a)(17)(E)), forcible oral copulation 
((a)(17)(F)), burglary ((a)(17)(G)), arson ((a)(17)(H)), train wrecking 
((a)(17)(I)), mayhem ((a)(17)(J)), rape by instrument ((a)(17)(K)) or 
carjacking ((a)(17)(L)); and 
1 “catchall” circumstance: the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel ((a)(14)). 
Id. As noted above, supra note 87, this last circumstance was held 
unconstitutional on vagueness grounds. 
 91.  People v. Bacigalupo, 862 P.2d 808, 813 (Cal. 1993) . 
 92.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(15) . 
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first-degree felony-murder conviction are also special 
circumstances,93 and California is one of only a handful of 
states where a defendant would be death-eligible for an 
unintentional, even wholly accidental, killing during a 
felony.94  The breadth of the special circumstances creates an 
extraordinarily large pool of potentially death-eligible 
defendants, and prosecutors have unfettered discretion to 
decide against which defendants they will seek death.95 
A. The Trial Court 
The trial of a capital case takes place in two stages.96 At 
the first stage, the “guilt phase,” the factfinder decides 
whether the defendant is guilty of first-degree murder, and, if 
so, whether one or more of the special circumstances charged 
by the prosecutor is proved true beyond a reasonable doubt.97  
Thus, unlike the procedure in many other states, the 
defendant’s death-eligibility is determined at the first phase 
of the bifurcated proceeding.  If the defendant is found to be 
death-eligible, the case proceeds to a “penalty phase,” where, 
with certain limited exceptions, the prosecution and defense 
may introduce additional evidence “as to any matter relevant 
to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence.”98 
Except for additional evidence relating to the murder or 
the special circumstances proved at the guilt phase, the 
prosecution has to give advance notice of any evidence in 
 
 93.  Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 with CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17). 
 94.  People v. Watkins, 290 P.3d 364, 390 (2013).  The other states are: 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho and Mississippi. See Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth 
Amendment, the Death Penalty, and Ordinary Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A 
California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. REV. 719, 761 (2007) (also listing Maryland, 
which has since repealed the death penalty). 
 95.  See, e.g., People v. Ramirez, 139 P.3d 64, 117 (Cal. 2006); People v. 
Gray, 118 P.3d 496, 543 (Cal. 2005). 
 96.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1.  If the defendant pleads not guilty by reason 
of insanity, there will be a third stage—the “sanity phase”—between the “guilt 
phase” and the “penalty phase.”  CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190.1(c), 190.4(c). 
 97.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a). 
 98.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3.  Such evidence may include: 
the nature and circumstances of the present offense, any prior felony 
conviction or convictions whether or not such conviction or convictions 
involved a crime of violence, the presence or absence of other criminal 
activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of 
force or violence or which involved the express or implied threat to use 
force or violence, and the defendant’s character, background, history, 
mental condition and physical condition. 
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aggravation it intends to introduce at the penalty phase.99  
The jury is instructed to take into account a list of eleven 
factors in reaching its penalty decision.100  The listed factors 
are not “propositional,” in the sense that the jury is required 
to give “a yes or no answer to a specific question.”101  At one 
time, the California Supreme Court took the position that 
only three of the eleven factors—(a) circumstances of the 
crime and any special circumstances found; (b) criminal 
activity involving force or violence; and (c) prior felony 
conviction—could be aggravating, and the rest could only be 
mitigating.102  Now, however, it appears that all the factors 
are to be viewed as neutral sentencing factors,103 and the jury 
is instructed at the conclusion of the penalty phase as follows: 
 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 provides: 
In determining the penalty, the trier of fact shall take into account any 
of the following factors if relevant: 
(a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was 
convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special 
circumstances found to be true pursuant to Section 190.1. 
(b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which 
involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or 
implied threat to use force or violence. 
(c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction. 
(d) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was 
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 
(e) Whether or not the victim was a participant in the defendant’s 
homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act. 
(f) Whether or not the offense was committed under circumstances 
which the defendant reasonably believed to be a moral justification or 
extenuation for his conduct. 
(g) Whether or not defendant acted under extreme duress or under the 
substantial domination of another person. 
(h) Whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his 
conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental 
disease or defect, or the effects of intoxication. 
(i) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. 
(j) Whether or not the defendant was an accomplice to the offense and 
his participation in the commission of the offense was relatively minor. 
(k) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime 
even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. 
 101.  Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 975 (1994). 
 102.  See People v. Whitt, 798 P.2d 849, 869 (Cal. 1990) (factors (d), (e), (f), 
(h), and (k) can only mitigate); People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d 730, 755 (Cal. 
1989) (factors (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (j) can only mitigate); People v. Rodriguez, 
726 P.2d 113, 151 (Cal. 1986) (factor (i), age, not an aggravating factor). 
 103.  See Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instruction 763. 
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You have sole responsibility to decide which penalty [the] 
defendant will receive. 
You must consider the arguments of counsel and all the 
evidence presented . . . 
In reaching your decision, you must consider, take into 
account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. Each of you is free to assign whatever 
moral or sympathetic value you find appropriate to each 
individual factor and to all of them together. Do not 
simply count the number of aggravating and mitigating 
factors and decide based on the higher number alone. 
Consider the relative or combined weight of the factors 
and evaluate them in terms of their relative convincing 
force on the question of punishment. 
Each of you must decide for yourself whether aggravating 
or mitigating factors exist. You do not all need to agree 
whether such factors exist. If any juror individually 
concludes that a factor exists, that juror may give the 
factor whatever weight he or she believes is appropriate. 
Determine which penalty is appropriate and justified by 
considering all the evidence and the totality of any 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Even without 
mitigating circumstances, you may decide that the 
aggravating circumstances are not substantial enough to 
warrant death. To return a judgment of death, each of you 
must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances 
both outweigh the mitigating circumstances and are also 
so substantial in comparison to the mitigating 
circumstances that a sentence of death is appropriate and 
justified.104 
If the jury does return a death verdict, the defendant is 
deemed to have moved for a modification of that verdict by 
the trial judge.105 
In ruling on the application, the judge shall review the 
evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in 
Section 190.3, and shall make a determination as to 
whether the jury’s findings and verdicts that the 
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances are contrary to law or the evidence 
 
 104.  Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instruction 766. 
 105.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e). 
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presented. The judge shall state on the record the reasons 
for his findings.106 
The California Supreme Court has generally described the 
trial court’s review in broad terms: 
In ruling on a verdict-modification application, the trial 
judge is required by section 190.4 [subdivision] (e) to 
“make an independent determination whether imposition 
of the death penalty upon the defendant is proper in light 
of the relevant evidence and the applicable law.” That is to 
say, he must determine whether the jury’s decision that 
death is appropriate under all the circumstances is 
adequately supported. And he must make that 
determination independently, i.e., in accordance with the 
weight he himself believes the evidence deserves.107 
The court’s most recent discussion of the standard appears in 
People v. Burgener.108  There the court reversed the denial of a 
§ 190.4(e) motion because the record did not indicate that the 
trial judge “understood his duty to independently reweigh the 
evidence and make an independent determination” and the 
judge’s remarks bore a “disturbing resemblance to the 
deferential substantial-evidence standard.”109  In early cases 
under the 1978 death penalty law, trial judges did modify 
death verdicts in at least ten cases.110  Then, in 1990,111 and 
 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  People v. Vieira, 106 P.3d 990, 1013 (Cal. 2005), quoting People v. 
Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 694 (Cal. 1990) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  
On occasion, the court has indicated that the review is more equivalent to one 
for sufficiency of the evidence: “[I]n ruling on the automatic motion to modify a 
death verdict, the trial judge’s function is not to make an independent and de 
novo penalty determination . . . .” People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627, 663 (Cal. 1989), 
citing with approval People v. Allison, 771 P.2d 1294, 1319 (Cal. 1989) 
(Kaufman, J., concurring) (standard is the “the long-settled standard for 
reviewing any jury verdict on a motion for new trial based on insufficiency of 
the evidence.”). 
 108.  People v. Burgener, 62 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003). 
 109.  Id. at 42–43. 
 110.  See People v. McDermand, 211 Cal.Rptr. 773 (Ct. App. 1984); People v. 
Harris, 237 Cal.Rptr. 747  (Ct. App. 1987); People v. Sparks, No. 78647 (Santa 
Clara Cty Sup. Ct., 1984); People v. Jones, No. A56792 (Los Angeles Cty Sup. 
Ct. 1984); People v. Polecat, 236 Cal.Rptr. 453 (Ct. App., 1987); People v. 
Bonillas, No. 23117 (San Bernardino Cty Sup. Ct. 1990); People v. Rodriguez, 
No. C-8773 (San Mateo Cty Sup. Ct. 1991); People v. Burgener, 272 Cal.Rptr. 
830 (1990); People v. Charan, No. KA006977 (Los Angeles Cty Sup. Ct. 1991) 
(noted in People v. Cleveland, 86 P.3d 302, 310 n.2 (Cal. 2004)); People v. Crew, 
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 111.  People v. Burgener, 272 Cal.Rptr. 830 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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again in 1991,112 the Court of Appeal overturned trial judges’ 
grants of relief under § 190.4(e).  Those decisions marked the 
end of robust review of death verdicts in the trial court—
there appears to be only one case since 1991 where a judge 
granted a § 190.4(e) motion.113 
B. The California Supreme Court 
Upon entry of a death judgment, the case is 
automatically appealed to the California Supreme Court.114  
Although the Supreme Court, in Pulley, equated meaningful 
appellate review with prompt review, review in the California 
Supreme Court is anything but prompt.  In 2008, the 
California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice 
(hereinafter, “Commission”), a bipartisan panel comprised of 
prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys, law enforcement 
officials, and a judge, undertook a comprehensive review of 
the California death penalty and found that “the average 
delay between judgment of death and final disposition of the 
automatic appeal is currently between 11.7 and 13.7 years” 
and that the delay was steadily increasing.115  To put that 
figure in context, the Commission reported that, in 2005, the 
nationwide average lapse of time between death sentence and 
execution was 12.25 years;116 so that, in the time it took other 
states to complete the review process in a death case—direct 
appeal, state collateral review and federal habeas corpus—
the average California death row inmate might not yet have 
completed the first step. 
The California Penal Code says nothing about the nature 
of the automatic appeal, except that, under § 190.4(e), on 
appeal, the trial court’s denial of the modification of the death 
penalty verdict “shall be reviewed.”117  Although the review of 
 
 112.  People v. Crew, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 755 (Ct. App. 1991). __ 
 113.  See Jennie Rodriguez-Moore, S.J. Judge Overturns Jury’s Death 
Sentence, RECORDNET.COM (June 11, 2013),  http://www.recordnet.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20130611/A_NEWS/306110324/-1/A_NEWS.  The text is 
qualified by the word “appears” because the issue is not easily researched and it 
is possible that a case or cases was missed. 
 114.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239. 
 115.  CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (Gerald 
Uelman ed., 2008) 131 [hereinafter, “Commission Report”], available at 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf. 
 116.  Id. at 122. 
 117.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e). 
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a denial of a § 190.4(e) motion might have been the vehicle for 
a robust proportionality review, it has not turned out that 
way.  Despite the seemingly mandatory nature of this review, 
the California Supreme Court does not in fact review the trial 
judge’s 190.4(e) opinion in most cases,118 but only in those 
cases where the defendant requests such review.  The court 
has described its review as follows: 
On appeal, we subject a ruling on such an application to 
independent review: the decision resolves a mixed 
question of law and fact; a determination of this kind is 
generally examined de novo. Of course, when we conduct 
such scrutiny, we simply review the trial court’s 
determination after independently considering the record; 
we do not make a de novo determination of penalty.119 
How the court can subject the trial court’s determination 
to independent and de novo review but not itself make a de 
novo determination is not clear, but in the end the test 
applied is whether the trial court’s determination was 
“contrary to law or the evidence.”120  This is ordinary review 
for legal error and substantial evidence, not proportionality 
review. 
On six occasions, the California Supreme Court has 
remanded the denial of a § 190.4(e) motion, but only for the 
failure of the trial judge to apply the correct standard or to 
make required findings, never on the merits of the death 
sentence.121  Since, in other cases with similar legal errors, 
the court has found the error to be harmless and affirmed the 
death sentence,122 in these six cases, the court presumably 
found the errors were not harmless.  Might the court have 
intended the remands as a signal to the trial court that relief 
 
 118.  See, e.g., People v. Montes, 320 P.3d 729, 796–97 (Cal. 2014) (discussing 
defendant’s claim that his death sentence was disproportionate, with no 
mention of § 190.4(e)); People v. Whalen, 294 P.3d 915, 985-86 (Cal. 2013) (also 
discussing defendant’s claim that his death sentence was disproportionate, with 
no mention of § 190.4(e)). 
 119.  People v. Zambrano, 163 P.3d 4, 75 (Cal. 2007) (quoting People v. 
Mickey, 818 P.2d 84, 135 (Cal. 1991) (citation omitted)). 
 120.  Id. at 76. 
 121.  See People v. Burgener, 62 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2003); People v. Lewis, 786 P.2d 
892 (Cal. 1990); People v. Sheldon, 771 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1989); People v. Bonillas, 
771 P.2d 844 (Cal. 1989); People v. Brown, 756 P.2d 204 (Cal. 1988); People v. 
Rodriguez, 726 P.2d 113 (Cal. 1986). 
 122.  See People v. Allison, 771 P.2d 1294, 1317 (Cal. 1989); People v. 
Heishman, 753 P.2d 629, 665 (Cal. 1988). 
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should be granted?  If so, the signal was ignored in four of the 
six cases,123 and one of the cases illustrates what can go awry 
if the court was in fact trying to do indirectly what it could 
have done directly.  Michael Ray Burgener was sentenced to 
death for the 1980 murder of a 7-Eleven clerk in the course of 
a robbery.  In 1986, he obtained a penalty reversal because, 
acting pursuant to Burgener’s instructions, Burgener’s 
counsel had presented no mitigating evidence at the penalty 
phase, even though such evidence was available.124  At the 
penalty retrial in 1988, Burgener was again sentenced to 
death, but the trial judge set aside the death sentence under § 
190.4(e) and imposed a sentence of life without parole.125  The 
People appealed the sentence, and the Court of Appeal 
reversed on the ground that the trial judge had based his 
ruling in part on matters he should not have considered (the 
risk the jury would consider evidence that had been stricken, 
the likelihood of reversal, the cost of a retrial).126  On remand, 
the original trial judge having retired, the § 190.4(e) motion 
was heard before a different judge, who denied the motion.127  
On his automatic appeal, Burgener once more won a penalty 
reversal, this time on the ground that the trial judge had 
failed to conduct an “independent” review of the evidence.128  
On remand, Burgener was granted permission to represent 
himself at his § 190.4(e) hearing, and his motion again was 
denied.129  In 2009, on Burgener’s third automatic appeal, the 
California Supreme Court again set aside his sentence, 
holding that the trial court had failed to insure that 
Burgener’s waiver of counsel was knowing and intelligent.130  
The judge who conducted the previous two § 190.4(e) hearings 
having died, the fifth such hearing was held before yet 
another judge, and again Burgener’s motion was denied and 
he was sentenced to death.131  Thirty-four years after 
 
 123.  Only defendants Bonillas and Rodriguez had their death sentences 
finally set aside. 
 124.  People v. Burgener, 714 P.2d 1251 (Cal. 1986). 
 125.  People v. Burgener, 272 Cal.Rptr. 830, 833 (Ct. App. 1990). 
 126.  Id. at 834. 
 127.  People v. Burgener, 62 P.3d 1, 14 (Cal. 2003). 
 128.  Id. at 43. 
 129.  People v. Burgener, 206 P.3d 420, 424 (Cal. 2009). 
 130.  Id. at 428–30. 
 131.  See Appellant’s Opening Brief, People v. Burgener, 2012 Cal. LEXIS 
1177 (2012) (No. S179181), 2012 WL 1365087,at *3. 
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Burgener was first sentenced to death, his fourth automatic 
appeal is currently pending before the California Supreme 
Court. 
Apart from its review under § 190.4(e), the California 
Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment 
requires the court to engage in “proportionality review,” at 
least when the defendant requests such review.132  The court 
has held that this Eighth Amendment requirement is 
satisfied by review under the state constitution’s “cruel or 
unusual punishment” provision, Article I, Section 17.133  The 
predecessor to this provision was first applied to invalidate a 
sentence in the 1972 case, In re Lynch.134  The court there 
described the standard to be applied in the following terms: a 
punishment would constitute cruel or unusual punishment if 
it was “so disproportionate to the crime for which it is 
inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends 
fundamental notions of human dignity.”135  The court then 
went on to hold unconstitutional a recidivist provision setting 
the punishment for second offense indecent exposure at one 
year to life in prison.136  Although the court did recite the 
facts of the case, which indicated that the exposure may have 
been unintentional,137 the holding—that the provision 
imposed a disproportionate punishment—was categorical, not 
case-based. 
Over the next decade, Lynch was followed in a series of 
cases striking down excessive prison terms.  In In re Foss138 
and In re Grant,139 the court struck provisions holding 
recidivist narcotics offenders parole-ineligible for ten years.  
In In re Rodriguez,140 the court ordered the release of a 
defendant who had served twenty-two years in prison for a 
brief, nonviolent act of child molestation, when it appeared 
that neither the circumstances of his offense nor his personal 
characteristics made him a danger to society.  In In re 
 
 132.  People v. Wallace, 189 P.3d 911, 958–59 (Cal. 2008). 
 133.  People v. Dykes, 209 P.3d 1, 71–73 (Cal. 2009). 
 134.  In re Lynch, 503 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1972). 
 135.  Id. at 930. 
 136.  Id. at 940. 
 137.  Id. at 939–40. 
 138. In re Foss, 519 P.2d 1073 (Cal. 1974). 
 139. In re Grant, 553 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1976). 
 140. In re Rodriquez, 537 P.2d 384 (Cal. 1975). 
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Reed,141 the court struck the requirement that persons 
convicted of misdemeanor public lewdness must register with 
the police as sex offenders.  In all four cases, the court applied 
the Lynch “shock the conscience” test.142  Meanwhile, in a 
case under the 1977 death penalty law, the court stated that 
Lynch would govern its proportionality review of death 
sentences, and the court described its review under Lynch as 
requiring examination of “the nature of the offense and/or the 
offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both 
present to society” and comparison with other crimes 
punished less severely in this state and with punishments in 
other states all “to assure that justice is dispensed in a 
reasonably evenhanded manner.”143 
People v. Dillon144 was the high water mark of the court’s 
Article 1, Section 17 jurisprudence.  In Dillon, the defendant, 
a 17-year-old high school student, was convicted of first-
degree murder on the following facts.  Dillon and a friend 
decided to steal marijuana that grew on a secluded farm run 
by the victim, Johnson, and his brother.  Dillon made two 
scouting trips to the farm, during one of which, Johnson 
appeared with a shotgun and ran him off.  Dillon and a friend 
then recruited six other classmates to go to the farm to rob 
Johnson of his marijuana.  Dillon was armed with a semi-
automatic rifle, and several of the others were armed with 
shotguns or other weapons.  The group split up and 
approached the marijuana field from different directions.  
Dillon saw Johnson coming up a trail toward him with a 
shotgun.  When Johnson drew near, Dillon began firing at 
him, hitting him nine times and killing him.  The majority, 
after citing to Lynch and the “shocks the conscience” 
standard,145 held that the punishment for first-degree murder 
(twenty-five years to life) was disproportionate to Dillon’s 
culpability.  According to the court, Dillon was immature and 
 
 141. In re Reed, 663 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1983).  The case was later overruled on 
the ground the registration requirement was not “punishment.”  In re Alva, 92 
P.3d 311, 334 (2004). 
 142.  The court also cited the provision in two other cases where it granted 
relief to a defendant, but the court’s decisions appear to be grounded in due 
process rather than cruel or unusual punishment.  See People v. Feagley, 535 
P.2d 373 (Cal. 1975); People v. Schueren, 516 P.2d 833 (1973). 
 143.  People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 611–12 (Cal., 1979). 
 144.  People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983). 
 145.  Id. at 719–20. 
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had no prior record, and he killed in a “suddenly developing 
situation” when he thought his life was in danger.146  In 
support of its finding that Dillon’s punishment was excessive, 
the court emphasized that none of Dillon’s companions (who 
could have been prosecuted for first degree murder as 
accomplices to the attempted robbery) were convicted of any 
homicide or sent to state prison for any crime.147 
As was true at the time of the Pulley case, review under 
Article 1 Section 17 does not include comparative 
proportionality review.148  The California Supreme Court has 
never fully explained its refusal to engage in comparative 
proportionality review under the 1978 law.  When it first 
considered the issue under the 1977 death penalty law, it was 
in the context of an Eighth Amendment challenge to the 
statute based on its lack of an express requirement for such 
review.149  The court noted that the legislature, in framing the 
law, had rejected a proposal to require such review, and then 
held (as the United States Supreme Court would later hold in 
Pulley) that comparative proportionality review was not 
constitutionally required.150  The court described its review 
under Lynch as satisfying “minimum federal constitutional 
standards.”151  Subsequently, when the issue has been raised 
under the much broader 1978 death penalty law (which had 
no comparable legislative history), the court has reiterated its 
holding regarding the 1977 law and disposed of the issue with 
the statement that comparative proportionality review is not 
constitutionally required.152  For example, in People v. 
Turner,153 the defendant, who was sentenced to death in a 
single-victim, robbery-murder case, where his testimony and 
some circumstantial evidence suggested that he stabbed the 
victim after being attacked and not for the purpose of theft, 
challenged the proportionality of his sentence.  To support his 
challenge, the defendant presented “an elaborate survey of 
published Court of Appeal decisions to demonstrate the 
 
 146.  Id. at 726–27. 
 147.  Id. at 727. 
 148.  See, e.g., People v. Pollock, 89 P.3d 353, 380 (Cal. 2004). 
 149.  People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 610–12 (Cal. 1979). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 612. 
 152.  See, e.g., People v. Moore, 247 P.3d 515, 539 (Cal. 2011); People v. Snow, 
65 P.3d 749, 800 (Cal. 2003). 
 153.  People v. Turner, 789 P.2d 887 (Cal. 1990). 
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hypothesis that many first degree murderers of equal or 
greater culpability have received sentences less than 
death.”154  However, although the California Supreme Court 
could have considered the survey and thereby engaged in 
comparative proportionality review—just as courts in other 
death penalty states have adopted comparative 
proportionality review, although not required to by the 
Eighth Amendment or state statute155—the court chose to 
ignore the survey, stating “[c]omparative proportionality 
review is not constitutionally required, and we have 
consistently declined to undertake it.”156 
The California Supreme Court’s position on intracase 
comparative proportionality review has not been quite so 
clear.  In Dillon, the court relied heavily, in its 
proportionality analysis, on the disparate punishments that 
Dillon’s co-defendants received (terming them “petty 
chastisements”).157  In the death penalty context, however, 
the court has stated consistently, and without explanation, 
that it will not engage in such review. 
Although . . . proportionality analysis takes into account 
the defendant’s relative responsibility for the crime as 
compared to others who were involved, the disposition of 
codefendants’ cases is not part of the analysis.158 
Justice Mosk, the author of Lynch and Dillon, repeatedly 
dissented from this rule,159 and the court seems not always to 
have applied it.  For example, in People v. Ochoa,160 the court 
 
 154.  Id. at 916. 
 155.  See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 44 (1984) (describing review by 
Florida Supreme Court); People v. Blackwell, 665 N.E.2d 782, 792–93 (Ill. 
1996); State v. Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 374 (Utah, 2001). 
 156.  People v. Turner, 789 P.2d 887, 916 (Cal. 1990).  The court then went 
on to find the death penalty not disproportionate because of the manner of the 
killing, “a savage, sustained, and murderous knife assault.” 
 157.  People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 727 (Cal. 1983). 
 158.  People v. Ledesma, 140 P.3d 657, 732–33 (Cal. 2006).  Accord People v. 
Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 1016 (Cal. 1992) (“Properly understood, intracase 
proportionality review is ‘an examination of whether defendant’s death sentence 
is proportionate to his individual culpability, irrespective of the punishment 
imposed on others.’ ” ) (quoting People v. Adcox, 763 P.2d 906, 944 (1988) (italics 
in original)). 
 159.  See People v. Beardslee, 806 P.2d 1311, 1341 (Cal. 1991) (Mosk, J., 
concurring and dissenting); People v. Carrera, 777 P.2d 121, 156 (Cal. 1989) 
(Mosk, J., concurring); People v. Adcox, 763 P.2d 906, 947 (Cal. 1988) (Mosk, J. 
concurring and dissenting). 
 160.  People v. Ochoa, 28 P.3d 78, 111–12 (Cal. 2001). 
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stated that, given the role he played in two murders, the 
defendant’s death sentence was not disproportionate to the 
sentences received by his accomplices, and in People v. 
Sanders161 the court, in its proportionality analysis, compared 
the role played by Sanders with that of his life-sentenced co-
defendant.162 
The court’s refusal to consider the outcome of a co-
defendant’s case in its proportionality analysis also extends to 
a refusal to consider the factual theory and evidence 
presented by the prosecutor at the co-defendant’s trial.163  For 
example, in People v. Allison,164 Allison and Bonner were 
charged with a break-in robbery-murder, and the prosecutor 
sought the death penalty against both.  Bonner was tried 
first, and the prosecutor’s theory was that Bonner and Allison 
had both entered the victim’s apartment and that Bonner had 
been the one to shoot the victim.  In support of this version of 
the facts, the prosecutor called a jailhouse informant, who 
testified that Bonner confessed the entire crime to him, 
including that Bonner had shot the victim.  And, in his 
closing argument, the prosecutor said: “What evidence did I 
ask you to consider in putting the gun in the hand of Samuel 
Bonner? His own words saying he did it. That is not 
circumstantial evidence. It is direct evidence and an 
admission of fact, if you believe it.”165  At Allison’s trial, the 
informant’s testimony was not introduced, and the prosecutor 
 
 161.  People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 596 (Cal. 1990). 
 162.  Id. (“[W]e observe that of the two assailants, defendant was the one 
with the motive to silence [the victims]; he—and not Cebreros [the co-
defendant]—was the one armed with a firearm.  On the state of the evidence he 
was as likely as Cebreros to have been the actual killer and the jury found, at 
least impliedly, that he acted with the intent to kill, and that he had committed 
five prior armed robberies.  Thus, even were we disposed to find significance in 
the fact that Cebreros received a life sentence, we cannot conclude that 
defendant’s death sentence is constitutionally suspect.”) 
 163.  In a number of cases, California prosecutors have used inconsistent 
theories in the separate trials of co-defendants charged with capital crimes, 
using the evidence and attempting to draw the inferences most damning to the 
particular defendant on trial at the time.  See generally Steven F. Shatz & 
Lazuli M. Whitt, The California Death Penalty: Prosecutors’ Use of Inconsistent 
Theories Plays Fast and Loose With the Courts and the Defendants, 36 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 853 (2002). 
 164.  People v. Allison, 771 P.2d 1294 (Cal. 1989). 
 165.  Notice of Motion and Motion for Evidentiary Hearing; Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities at 23, Allison v. Calderon, No. CV 92-6404-CAS (C.D. 
Cal. June 23, 2000). 
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ridiculed Allison’s defense that Bonner was the actual killer: 
“The evidence all points to Allison is the one going in [sic], 
and all the evidence that’s reasonable and believable that you 
will look at shows Bonner drove the [getaway car] and was 
not the inside man.”166  In its proportionality review of 
Allison’s death sentence, the court ignored entirely the 
prosecutor’s theory and evidence at the Bonner trial and 
affirmed the death sentence, stating “[d[efendant was found 
to have personally committed an execution-style murder in 
the course of a planned robbery of the victim.”167 
*** 
The California Supreme Court has a statutory obligation 
to review death penalty verdicts under § 190.4(e), and the 
court has recognized its obligation under the Eighth 
Amendment to conduct proportionality review of death 
sentences.  However, the court has taken a narrow view of 
both obligations, arguably too narrow to meet the Supreme 
Court’s “meaningful appellate review” standard. 
III. THE CASE FOR COMPARATIVE PROPORTIONALITY 
REVIEW OF DEATH SENTENCES IN CALIFORNIA 
When the Supreme Court suggested in Pulley that 
comparative proportionality review might be required if a 
state’s death penalty scheme was lacking in “other checks on 
arbitrariness,”168 the principal “other check” the Court 
presumably had in mind was the other Furman requirement: 
statutory narrowing of the death-eligible class.  Indeed, the 
Court emphasized that California’s scheme seemed to limit 
death sentences to “a small subclass of capital-eligible 
cases.”169  The California Supreme Court has repeatedly cited 
 
 166.  Petitioner’s Reply to Respondent’s Opposition to Motion for Evidentiary 
Hearing and Opposition to Respondent’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
at 46, Allison v. Woodford, No. CV 92-6404-CAS (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2001) 
(alteration in original). 
 167.  People v. Allison, 771 P.2d 1294, 1318 (Cal. 1989).  The court adopted a 
similar approach in in Sanchez.  People v. Sanchez, 906 P.2d 1129 (Cal. 1995). 
Defendant Sanchez was convicted of three murders as an accomplice, and the 
court, in considering the proportionality of the death sentence, ignored the fact 
that the prosecutor, in her case against co-defendant Reyes, presented evidence 
that, as to two of the victims, it was Reyes who struck the blows that, at 
Sanchez’s trial, she had attributed to Sanchez  Id. at 1183. 
 168.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 51 (1984). 
 169.  Id. at 53. 
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Pulley, not only for the proposition that comparative 
proportionality review is not constitutionally required, but 
also for the proposition that the present California scheme 
satisfies Furman’s narrowing requirement.170  However, 
Pulley is no authority for either proposition for two reasons.  
First, the 1978 Death Law is far broader than the 1977 law at 
issue in Pulley,171 and the Supreme Court has never held that 
the 1978 law satisfies the statutory narrowing 
requirement.172  Second, the Court, in Pulley only assumed 
that the special circumstances “limit[ed] the death sentence 
to a small subclass,”173 but acknowledged the possibility that 
additional evidence might be presented to show that the 
scheme did not comply with Furman.174 
A. An Overbroad Death Penalty Scheme 
In the last twenty years, that additional evidence has 
been developed.  Of course, the drafters of the Briggs 
Initiative (and presumably the voters who passed it) never 
intended to narrow the death-eligible class; rather, their 
intent, as expressed in the ballot proposition arguments, was 
to make the death penalty applicable to all murderers: 
And, if you were to be killed on your way home tonight 
simply because the murderer was high on dope and 
wanted the thrill, the criminal would not receive the death 
penalty. Why? Because the Legislature’s weak death 
penalty law does not apply to every murderer. Proposition 
 
 170.  See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 237 P.3d 474, 500, 529 (Cal. 2010); People 
v. Stanley, 897 P.2d 481, 530 (Cal. 1995). 
 171.  See Shatz & Rivkind, supra, note 15 at 1310–13. 
 172.  In Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967 (1994), a case challenging the 
Penal Code § 190.3 selection factors, Justice Blackmun observed that the 
Supreme Court had never given the California system “a clean bill of health”: 
[T]he Court’s opinion says nothing about the constitutional adequacy of 
California’s eligibility process, which subjects a defendant to the death 
penalty if he is convicted of first-degree murder and the jury finds the 
existence of one “special circumstance.” By creating nearly 20 such 
special circumstances, California creates an extraordinarily large death 
pool. Because petitioners mount no challenge to these circumstances, 
the Court is not called on to determine that they collectively perform 
sufficient, meaningful narrowing. 
Id. at 994 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 173.  Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 53 (1984). 
 174.  Id. at 53–54. 
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7 [the Briggs Initiative] would.175 
The initiative came close to achieving its purpose.  Various 
empirical studies, using different databases and covering 
different time periods have demonstrated—what is apparent 
from the law on its face—that the special circumstances of 
Penal Code § 190.2 so overlap the definition of first degree 
murder in Penal Code §§ 187–189 as to make the 
overwhelming majority of first degree murderers death-
eligible.  Three of the empirical studies were conducted by 
this author176—a pilot study of appellate murder cases 
decided 1988–92 (“Appellate Study”),177 a study of murder 
convictions over a twenty-three year period in a single county 
(“Alameda Study”),178 and a statewide study of first-degree 
murder convictions during the period 2003–05 (“Statewide 
Study”).179  All three studies used databases of defendants 
convicted of first-degree murder.180  The data from the three 
 
 175.  STATE OF CALIFORNIA, VOTER’S PAMPHLET 34 (1978). Under 
California law, ballot arguments constitute the legislative history used to 
interpret initiative measures. See, e.g., Long Beach City Employees Ass’n v. City 
of Long Beach, 719 P.2d 660, 663 n.5 (Cal. 1986). 
 176.  Data from these studies is available from the author.  Where particular 
findings have been previously discussed, citations are provided. 
 177.  See Shatz & Rivkind, supra, note 15. 
 178.  See Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty 
with Statistics: Furman, McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1227 (2013). 
 179.  The study refers, for convenience, to convictions during the period 
2003–2005.  In fact, the study covered convicted defendants received by the 
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation during the period 
2003–2005.  Thus, the study included a few defendants convicted in late 2002 
and excluded a few defendants convicted in late 2005.  The initial data for the 
Statewide Study consisted of pre-sentence reports (“PSR”s) obtained through 
discovery in People v. Lewis, No SCD 193558 (San Diego Co.).  The PSRs were 
produced under a protective order prohibiting the disclosure of confidential 
information.  Although it seems clear that the crime facts discussed in this 
Article should not be covered by the protective order, I have chosen not to 
identify cases by name or court number unless the crime facts appear in the 
public record, either in an appellate opinión or a newspaper account.  
Otherwise, I identify cases by their number in the study.  Researchers 
interested in obtaining additional data from the study may do so by agreeing to 
comply with the terms of the protective order. The study is discussed in Shatz & 
Shatz, supra note 17 at 64. 
 180.  Juveniles convicted of first-degree murder are not death-eligible under 
both the Eighth Amendment (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)) and Penal 
Code § 190.5, and they are excluded from these calculations.  The use of a data 
set limited to first degree murder cases is a more conservative approach than 
that taken by other researchers.  Compare Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra, 
note 17 at 1070–71 (2013) (all murder convictions); Raymond Paternoster, 
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studies on the death-eligibility rates for adults convicted of 
first-degree murder and the death-sentence rate for those 
who were factually death-eligible is set out in the chart below: 
 
 
Data Set Murder Dates 
Death-
eligibility 
Rate 
Death-
sentence 
Rate 
Appellate 
Study 
404 
cases Generally 1980s 87.0%181 11.4%182 
Alameda 
Study 
473 
cases 
Generally 1980s, 
1990s 87.0% 12.8%183 
Statewide 
Study 
1300 
cases Generally 2000s 84.5%   5.5%184 
 
The largest ever study of death sentence rates in 
California was that completed in 2010 by David Baldus and 
his colleagues.185  The study included all non-negligent 
homicide convictions for the period 1978–2002—27,453 cases 
in all—analyzed by means of a stratified sample of 1900 
cases.186  The study found a death-eligibility rate of 95% 
under the then current (2008) law:187 “[T]he rate of death 
eligibility among California homicide cases is the highest in 
the nation by every measure. This result is a product of the 
number and breadth of special circumstances under 
California law.”188  The study found a death-sentence rate 
among statutorily death-eligible defendants of 4.6%, “among 
the lowest in the nation and over two-thirds lower than the 
 
Robert Brame, Sarah Bacon & Andrew Ditchfield, Justice by Geography and 
Race: The Administration of the Death Penalty in Maryland, 1978–1999, 4 
MARGINS 1, 15 (2004) (all first- and second-degree murders); Baldus et al., note 
2 at 90 (all non-negligent homicides). 
 181.  Shatz & Rivkind, supra, note 15 at 1331. 
 182.  Id. at 1332. 
 183.  Shatz & Dalton, supra, note 178 at 1259. 
 184.  In 510 of the 1,000 cases where the defendant was factually death-
eligible, a special circumstance was found or admitted.  Thus, the death-
sentence rate for those as to whom all findings necessary for a death sentence 
had been made was 10.8%. 
 185.  Declaration of David C. Baldus at 2, Ashmus v. Wong (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
18, 2010) (No. C 93-0594 THE) [hereinafter “Baldus Declaration”]. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 13. 
 188.  Id. at 35. 
SHATZ FINAL 12/29/2015  1:32 PM 
112 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
death sentencing rate in pre-Furman Georgia.”189  Taking all 
the studies together, it seems clear that the death sentence 
rate under the current California death penalty scheme has 
never produced a statewide death-sentence rate even 
approaching the 15–20% death-sentence rate produced by the 
schemes held unconstitutional in Furman.190 
In Furman, the overall death-sentence rate was 
sufficiently low that the majority justices were willing to 
assume that the results would be arbitrary and to reject 
Georgia’s contention that the infrequent use of the death 
penalty represented “informed selectively.”191  The same 
assumption might be made based on the even less frequent 
use of the death penalty by California, but it may be useful to 
further unpack the data.  Looking at the data and comparing 
various kinds of murder will (to borrow Justice Blackmun’s 
phrase) necessarily involve the “distasteful and absurd . . . 
project of parsing this lexicon of death.”192  However, there is 
no way to talk about whether a particular scheme reserves 
the death penalty for the defendants who have committed “ ‘ a 
narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose 
extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of 
execution’ ” 193—the “worst of the worst”194—without 
 
 189.  Id. at 36. 
 190.  Id. at 27. In a recent and provocative law review article arguing against 
challenging state death penalty schemes on Furman “failure-to-narrow” 
grounds, Professor Robert Smith asserts that arbitrariness and discrimination 
“are less of a blatant problem today than when the Court decided Furman” and 
states that “today, roughly 11% of offenders convicted of first-degree murder in 
California receive the death penalty.”  Robert J. Smith, Forgetting Furman, 100 
IOWA L. REV. 1149, 1160, 1169 (2015). The source of Smith’s 11% figure is 
unclear, but the figure is wrong.  The percentage of defendants convicted of 
first-degree murder who are sentenced to death has never been that high, and 
today, as measured by the Statewide Study, the figure today would be 4.2%.  In 
fact, the death-sentence rate for death-eligible defendants convicted of first 
degree murder is only 5.5%, far below the estimated 15% death-sentence rate in 
California at the time of Furman. See Petitioner’s Brief at 4f-5f, Aikens v. 
California, 406 U.S. 813 (1972) (No. 68-5027) (Citing estimate of former Director 
of California Department of Corrections and statistics from 1967 and 1969). In 
short, contrary to Smith’s assertion, arbitrariness, as measured by the death 
sentence rate, is a far greater problem in California today than it was pre-
Furman. 
 191.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 192.  Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 489 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 193.  Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002)). 
 194.  Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2760 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
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discussing the facts of various murder cases. 
What all three California studies by this author 
demonstrate is that Justice Stewart overstated his case when, 
in Furman, he analogized the imposition of the death penalty 
to being struck by lightning195—death sentences are not 
imposed in an altogether random fashion.  Certain kinds of 
death-eligible murder cases result in a much higher 
percentage of death sentences than others.196  The three 
studies generated consistent findings about which types of 
murders were considered most egregious, most “death-
worthy.”  Because the Statewide Study was both much larger 
and more recent than the other studies, and because, unlike 
the two earlier studies, most of the murders occurred under 
the broadest (post-2000) version of the California death 
penalty scheme, the following findings are taken from that 
study.  In the Statewide Study, the kind of murder cases most 
likely to end in a death sentence were murders accompanied 
by sexual assault, referred to here as “rape-murders.”197  In 
rape-murder cases, the death-sentence rate was 35.3%.  The 
kind of murder cases next most likely to result in a death 
sentence were cases involving more than one murder, i.e., the 
defendant was convicted of two or more murders in the 
instant proceeding or had previously been convicted of 
murder (“multiple murder” cases).198  The death-sentence rate 
for multiple murder cases was 16.6%.199  In all other cases—
 
(quoting Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting)). 
 195.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
 196.  The studies, unlike the Baldus Georgia study, or his later study of the 
New Jersey death penalty, did not attempt to identify the various factors 
beyond circumstances of the crime that might have affected death sentencing. 
See David Baldus, When Symbols Clash: Reflections on the Future of the 
Comparative Proportionality Review of Death Sentences, 26 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1582 (1996). 
 197.  Reflected in the special circumstances for rape, forcible sodomy, lewd 
and lascivious acts upon a child, forcible oral copulation and rape by 
instrument. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(17)(C), (D), (E), (F), (K). 
 198.   Reflected in the special circumstances for prior murder conviction or 
multiple murder convictions. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(2), (3). 
 199.  One much smaller category, the killing of particular victims—police 
officers, public officials, witnesses—did result in a higher death sentence rate, 
22.9%, but the category is too small (35 cases, almost half of which overlapped 
the other two “aggravated” categories) to generate meaningful statistics.  This 
category included eight police officer first degree murders, four resulting in a 
death sentence. 
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single-murder cases not involving sexual assault—the death-
sentence rate was 1.6%.  A substantial majority of these other 
cases fell within one or the other (or sometimes both) of two 
categories: theft-related felony-murders (robbery, carjacking 
burglary for purposes of theft), referred to here as “robbery-
murders” and intentional murders committed for the benefit 
of a criminal street gang (“gang-murder” cases).  The death 
sentence rate for cases in these two categories (where there 
was no other potentially more aggravating factor, e.g., murder 
of a peace officer, murder for financial gain, murder during a 
non-theft felony, torture murder200) was 1.6% for robbery-
murder and 0.0% for gang-murder.  The data is set out in the 
chart below: 
 
 
TOTAL 
CASES 
DEATH 
SENTENCE 
DEATH 
SENTENCE 
RATE 
MULTIPLE MURDER   157   26 16.6% 
RAPE-MURDER 51   18 35.3% 
ROBBERY-MURDER 
(1 vict.)   251 4 1.6% 
GANG-MURDER  
(1 vict.)   279 1 0.0% 
  
At 35.3%, the death-sentence rate for rape-murders is 
high enough that, were the California death penalty scheme 
limited to such murders, one might conclude that the scheme 
met Furman’s narrowing requirement because a “substantial 
portion” of those made death-eligible were being sentenced to 
death.  Of course, the scheme is not so limited, and rape-
murders account for less than a third (18/55) of the death 
sentences in the study.201  Does the fact that eighteen rape-
murderers were sentenced to death and thirty-three were not 
demonstrate “informed selectivity” on the part of the 
prosecutors and juries?  Given the number of factors, 
legitimate and illegitimate, that might go into death-charging 
 
 200.  Two statutory aggravating factors, lying in wait and shooting from a 
vehicle, which frequently occur with gang-murders and rarely result in death 
sentences, are not considered aggravating for these purposes. 
 201.  The percentages in the earlier studies were: Appellate Study – 22.3%; 
Alameda Study – 20.4%. 
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and death-sentencing decisions, the question cannot be 
answered from the study data, but the facts as to some of the 
rape-murders that did not result in a death sentence might 
suggest arbitrariness.  Two defendants not sentenced to death 
each raped and killed more than once.202  One of these 
defendants admitted to having raped and killed two women, 
sodomized and killed two men, after torturing the victims, yet 
he was allowed to avoid the death penalty by pleading 
guilty.203  Four other defendants not sentenced to death were 
found to have tortured their victims in addition to sexually 
assaulting them.204 
Unlike the much higher death-sentence rate for rape-
murders, the 16.6% death-sentence rate for multiple murders 
falls within the range where the justices in the Furman 
majority would have characterized the death sentence as 
sufficiently infrequent so as to create a presumption of 
arbitrariness.  Is there any non-arbitrary explanation for why 
twenty-six defendants convicted of multiple murders were 
sentenced to death while 131 were not?  A majority (14/26) of 
those sentenced to death killed more than two victims, and, of 
the remainder, one tortured and sexually assaulted his 
victims205 and one killed a witness.206  However, seventeen 
defendants found guilty of committing three or more murders 
were not sentenced to death, and among the defendants who 
killed two victims and were not sentenced to death were the 
 
 202.  People v. Dixon, No. SCD 160171 (San Diego Co.) (see Onell R. Soto, 
Killer Sentenced to Four Consecutive Life Terms SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, 
2003 WLNR 16801986 (Mar. 15, 2003)); People v. Douglas, No. C–54321 
(Orange Co.) (see Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
 203.  Dixon, supra note 202. 
 204.  People v. Alcazar, No. SCN-116325 (San Diego Co.) (see People v. 
Alcazar, 2005 WL 236533 (Ct. App. 2005)) People v. McIntosh, No. NCR54957 
(see People v. McIntosh, 2004 WL 2677198 (Ct. App. 2004)); People v. Wigley, 
No. CRF02-9762 (Del Norte Co.) (see People v. Wigley, 2007 WL 4171631 (Ct. 
App. 2007); Case #1188.  The fact that some (or many) egregious murders are 
not punished with death does not, in itself, prove arbitrariness, but describing 
those murders gives reassurance that the arbitrariness shown in the studies is 
not simply a statistical construct.  Justice Breyer used just this form of 
argument in his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2763 (2015) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 205.  People v. Erskine, No. SCD161640 (San Diego Co.) (see J. Harry Jones, 
The Long and Costly Trail Leading to Erskine’s Conviction in Slayings, SAN 
DIEGO TRIBUNE, 2004 WLNR 17010302 (Aug. 29, 2004). 
 206.  People v. Mendez, No. RIF090811 (Riverside Co.) (see People v. 
Rodriguez, 2011 WL 1885327 (Ct. App. 2011)). 
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two defendants mentioned above who sexually assaulted their 
victims, seven defendants who tortured or kidnapped their 
victims and numerous defendants who were guilty of theft-
related felonies. 
At the other end of the spectrum of death-eligible 
murders are robbery-murders and gang-murders. These were, 
by far, the most common of the death-eligible murders: 36.5% 
of the death-eligible cases involved a robbery-murder; and 
33.9% a gang-murder.207 (Fifty-seven cases involved both.) 
These are commonplace murders.  Absent some more 
aggravating factor, individually, or in combination, they 
rarely resulted in a death sentence.  Where death sentences 
are virtually never imposed for certain kinds of murder cases, 
the imposition of a death sentence in such a case penalty is 
arbitrary and should be unconstitutional.208 
B. The Absence of Checks on Arbitrariness in the Trial 
Court 
California’s overbroad definition of death eligibility is not 
mitigated by checks against arbitrariness elsewhere in the 
scheme.  Prosecutors have unfettered discretion in their 
decisions to seek the death penalty in capital murder cases.209  
That discretion is so jealously guarded that, when the 
Commission attempted to survey District Attorneys 
concerning the process by which their offices decided to seek 
the death penalty, the majority refused to respond.210  Since 
California is not a “weighing” state, one in which “the only 
aggravating factors permitted to be considered by the 
sentencer [are] the specified eligibility factors,”211 the special 
circumstance(s) found at the guilt phase are just one of eleven 
factors the jury is instructed to consider in the penalty 
decision.  The other ten factors, particularly the 
 
 207.  When not committed in the course of a theft-related felony, gang-
murders often implicated two other special circumstances: lying in wait (CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(15)) or “drive-by” shooting (CAL. PENAL CODE § 
190.2(a)(21)). 
 208.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 205–06. (1976) (plurality opinion) 
(citing with approval the Georgia’s Supreme Court’s understanding of the law). 
 209.  People v. Ramirez, 139 P.3d 64, 117 (Cal. 2006); People v. Gray, 118 
P.3d 496, 543 (Cal. 2005). 
 210.  Commission Report, supra note 115 at 152. 
 211.  Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 217–22 (2006). 
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“circumstances of the crime” factor,212 give the prosecutor 
broad discretion to introduce and argue aggravating evidence.   
 The wide-open nature of the penalty phase is perhaps 
best illustrated by California prosecutors’ use of “victim 
impact” videos. In 1991, in Payne v. Tennessee,213 the 
Supreme Court reversed recent precedents214 and held that 
the Eighth Amendment did not bar the introduction of “victim 
impact” evidence during the penalty phase of a capital trial.  
Accordingly, the state could permit the prosecutor to 
introduce evidence about the victim—a “quick glimpse” of the 
victim’s life215—and about the impact of the murder on the 
victim’s family.216  In the twenty-four years since Payne, the 
Supreme Court has not revisited the issue of victim impact 
evidence, but the California Supreme Court has relied on 
Payne to admit, as a circumstance of the crime,217 
professionally made videos, with soundtracks and music, 
documenting the victim’s life.  For example, in People v. 
Kelly,218 a case where the defendant was convicted of the 
rape, robbery and murder of a nineteen-year-old woman, the 
court found no error in admitting a video later described by 
Justice Stevens as follows: 
The prosecution played a 20-minute video consisting of a 
montage of still photographs and video footage 
documenting [the victim’s] life from her infancy until 
shortly before she was killed. The video was narrated by 
the victim’s mother with soft music playing in the 
background, and it showed scenes of her swimming, 
horseback riding, and attending school and social 
functions with her family and friends. The video ended 
with a view of her grave marker and footage of people 
riding horseback in Alberta, Canada—the “ ‘ kind of 
heaven’ ”  in which her mother said she belonged.219 
 
 212.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(a). 
 213.  Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
 214.  See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987); South Carolina v. Gathers, 
490 U.S. 805 (1989). 
 215.  Payne, 501 U.S. at 822; See also id. at 830 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 216.  Id. at 827. 
 217.  People v. Edwards, 819 P.2d 436, 465–67 (Cal. 1991). 
 218.  People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548 (Cal. 2007). 
 219.  Kelly v. California, 555 U.S. 1020 (2008) (Stevens, J., statement 
respecting the denial of the petitions for writs of  certiorari). The full video is 
available online.  See  Videotape, Kelly v. California Video, SUPREMECOURT.GOV 
(2008), http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/video/kelly_v_california.aspx. 
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One might reasonably ask what the victim’s childhood 
activities, a staged scene at her grave, a Canadian horseman 
or the videographer’s choice of “soft music” have to do with 
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, but the 
California Supreme Court found no error in its admission.220  
Justice Moreno, writing for himself alone, would have held 
that the admission of the video was error: 
[T]his videotape . . . contained video footage and not 
merely still photographs, was accompanied by evocative 
music more appropriate to a memorial service, and 
concluded on a frankly religious note. 
. . . [T]he punishment phase of a criminal trial is not a 
memorial service for the victim. What may be entirely 
appropriate eulogies to celebrate the life and 
accomplishments of a unique individual are not 
necessarily admissible in a criminal trial.” The videotape 
in the present case is akin to a eulogy, and should 
therefore not have been admitted as victim impact 
evidence.221 
Kelly is by no means an isolated case.  The California 
Supreme Court has found no error in the presentation of 
victim impact videos to the sentencing jury in at least eleven 
other cases.222  None of the other current death penalty states 
 
 220.  People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 572 (Cal. 2007). 
 221.  Id. at 576 (Moreno, J., concurring) (quoting Salazar v. State, 90 S.W.3d 
330, 335–36 (Tex. 2002)). 
 222.  See People v. Montes, 320 P.3d 729, 787–88 (Cal. 2014) (10½ minute 
video with 115 photos and a musical soundtrack, edited after objections in trial 
court); People v. Garcia, 258 P.3d 751, 783–84 (2011) (12-minute video of victim 
as a young boy, his wedding, asleep with a sleeping puppy, accompanied by 
music, lyrics, echo effects and voiceovers and a staged visit to the gravesite by 
the victim’s wife and child); People v. Vines, 251 P.3d 943, 985–86 (Cal. 2011) 
(5-minute video of victim singing and dancing); People v. Booker, 245 P.3d 366, 
405–06 (Cal. 2011) (three videos of photographs of victims totaling 16 minutes); 
People v. Brady, 236 P.3d 312, 337–39 (2010) (4-minute video of police officer 
victim at Christmas and 6-minute video of victim’s memorial and funeral 
services, including flag-draped casket in church, attendance by 4,000 uniformed 
police officers and other mourners, motorcade that stretched for miles, and 
bagpipe procession to gravesite); People v. Mills, 226 P.3d 276 (Cal. 2010) (video 
of victim’s boyfriend when he was told of victim’s murder); People v. Bramit, 210 
P.3d 1171, 1187 (2009) (video montage of 20 still photographs less than three 
minutes long); People v. Dykes, 209 P.3d 1, 45–48 (2009) (8-minute video of 
victim and his family preparing for, and going on a trip to Disneyland); People 
v. Zamudio, 181 P.3d 105, 134–37 (Cal. 2008) (14-minute video containing 118 
photos spanning lives of elderly couple from birth to grave, including close-ups 
of grave markers with inscriptions); People v. Prince, 156 P.3d 1015, 1038, 
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has carried the practice to the extreme reached in California.  
In fact, it seems that the California Supreme Court has 
approved the admission of victim impact videos in more death 
penalty cases than have the courts of the rest of those states 
combined,223 and the court has never set aside a death 
sentence on a finding that a victim impact video—or any 
other evidence offered by the prosecution under the 
“circumstances of the crime” aggravator—was improperly 
admitted. 
Finally, there is no check on arbitrariness at the jury’s 
selection decision.  As set out above,224 after hearing the 
penalty phase evidence, the jurors are instructed to consider 
a list of eleven factors in making their decision and to 
determine “which penalty is appropriate and justified by 
considering all the evidence and the totality of any 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” They are not told 
which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating, and 
studies suggest many probably do not understand the terms 
and how to use the factors.225  The prosecutor has no burden 
of proof with regard to the existence of aggravating 
circumstances (except for evidence of other crimes), the 
greater weight of aggravating circumstances over mitigating 
circumstances, or the appropriateness of a death sentence.226 
The jurors are not required to agree on the aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances, and they do not have to make 
findings in support of, or otherwise explain, their penalty 
 
1091–94 (2007) (25-minute television interview with victim); People v. Lewis, 
140 P.3d 775, 839–40 (2006) (brief video of victims in church). 
 223.  There appear to be only eight cases from the other thirty death penalty 
states where the court has approved the introduction of a victim impact video 
before a jury at the penalty phase.  See State v. Nelson, 273 P.3d 632, 642 (Ariz. 
2012); Hicks v. State, 940 S.W.2d 855, 855–57 (Ark. 1997); Tollette v. State, 621 
S.E.2d 742, 748 (Ga. 2005); State v. Leon, 132 P.3d 462, 464–67 (Ida. 2006); 
State v. Holmes, 5 So.3d 42, 73–75 (La. 2008); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 
389 (Mo. 1994); State v. Addison, 87 A.3d 1, 110–14 (N.H. 2014); State v. Bixby, 
698 S.E.2d 572, 586–87 (S.C. 2010). 
 224.  Supra, text accompanying notes 100–04. 
 225.  See Craig Haney and Mona Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death 
Matters: A Preliminary Study of California’s Capital Penalty Instructions, 18 
LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 411, 420 (1994); Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Clarifying 
Life and Death Matters: An Analysis of Instructional Comprehension and 
Penalty Phase Closing Arguments, 21 LAW AND HUM. BEHAV. 575, 577–79 
(1997). 
 226.  People v. Barnwell, 162 P.3d 596, 609–10 (Cal. 2007). 
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decision.227 
C. Arbitrary Death Sentences 
Given the absence of checks on arbitrariness in the 
California scheme, it would not be surprising if the scheme 
produced arbitrary results, and a number of empirical studies 
have found that to be the case.  In turn, the fact of arbitrary 
outcomes tends to prove that the scheme is not designed in a 
way to generate consistent results.  The outcomes reveal 
significant racial disparities.  In their study of death 
sentences during the period 1990–99, Glenn Pierce and 
Michael Radelet found “glaring differences in the rate of 
death sentences across categories of victim race/ethnicity.”228  
The Alameda Study found statistically significant evidence of 
intra-county “race of neighborhood” disparities in death 
charging and death sentencing.229  In brief, in Alameda 
County, a substantial majority of whites (68%) live in the 
southern half of the county, and the overwhelming majority of 
African-Americans (84%) live in the northern half.  The study 
found: that the District Attorney was almost two-and-a-half 
times more likely to seek death, and more than three-and-a-
half times more likely to obtain a death verdict, when the 
killing(s) occurred in the southern half of the county; and that 
this disparity could not be explained by the nature of the 
crime or the gender of the victim (two common explanatory 
factors).230 
In the Statewide Study, there were substantial, and 
otherwise unexplained, gender disparities.231 Although there 
were both gender-of-defendant disparities and gender-of-
victim disparities, the gender-of-victim disparities were 
dramatic.  In single-victim cases, factually death-eligible 
defendants convicted of killing women were more than seven 
times as likely to be sentenced to death as factually death-
eligible defendants who killed men.232  Pierce and Radelet 
 
 227.  People v. Solomon, 234 P.3d 501, 539 (Cal. 2010). 
 228.  Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Impact of Legally 
Inappropriate Factors on Death Sentencing for California Homicides, 1990–
1999,  46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 19 (2005). 
 229.   See Shatz & Dalton, supra note 178 at 1260–63 (describing the study). 
 230.  Id. at 1266–68. 
 231.  See Shatz & Shatz, supra note 17 at 105–10. 
 232.  Id. at 107.  While more than half that disparity can be accounted for by 
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also found substantial geographic disparities in California.  In 
their ten-year study, almost half the counties (28/58) had no 
death sentences whatsoever, and, in the counties with at least 
five death sentences, the ratio of death sentences per 100 
homicides varied from .58 to 5.0.233  The Statewide Study 
found similar geographic disparities.  Most of the counties 
(42/58) had no death sentences during the three-year period 
of the study.  Of the nine counties with at least twenty 
defendants convicted of first-degree murder and death-
eligible, the ratio of death sentences to death-eligible 
defendants ranged from .04 (Los Angeles) to more than .10 
(Orange, Riverside, San Diego). 
D. Arbitrary Executions 
California’s overbroad definition of death-eligibility and 
the absence of any checks on prosecutors’ or jurors’ discretion 
has led to an overproduction of death sentences, in turn 
causing the death penalty scheme to become dysfunctional.  
That point was made twenty years ago by Ninth Circuit 
Judge Alex Kozinski.  Speaking primarily of the California 
experience, he said: 
Increasing the number of crimes punishable by death, 
widening the circumstances under which death may be 
imposed, obtaining more guilty verdicts, and expanding 
the population of death rows will not do a single thing to 
accomplish the objective, namely to ensure that the very 
worst members of our society—those who, by their heinous 
and depraved conduct have relinquished all claim to 
human compassion—are put to death.234 
A decade later, several witnesses before the Commission 
testified to the same effect, that “the primary reason that the 
California Death Penalty Law is dysfunctional is because it is 
too broad, and simply permits too many murder cases to be 
prosecuted as death penalty cases.”235  Gerald Kogan, former 
 
the extraordinarily high death sentence rate for rape-murderers—almost 
sixteen times the death sentence rate for all other death-eligible murderers—
when rape-murders were excluded, the death sentence rate in female victim 
cases remained more than three times the rate for male victim cases. Id. at 108. 
 233.  Pierce & Radelet, supra note 228 at 27. 
 234.  Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On 
Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 29 (1995). 
 235.  Commission Report, supra note 115 at 138. 
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Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court, told the 
Commission that the number of special circumstances in 
California was “unfathomable.”236  Four commissioners, in 
their separate statement explained the problem as follows: 
One of the most significant findings in our Report is that 
the death penalty encompasses 87% of all first degree 
murders committed in this state.  . . . There are now 670 
condemned inmates on death row.237  On the average, we 
had 20 new death judgments entering the appellate 
system annually in the last eight years.  We have an 
accumulated backlog in the Supreme Court of 180 fully 
briefs direct appeals and habeas cases awaiting decision, 
and the Court cannot process more than 30–40 of these 
cases a year.  The sheer volume, statewide, is 
overwhelming the appellate system.238 
The Commission found that the clogging of the Supreme 
Court docket and the inability, or unwillingness, of the state 
to commit sufficient resources to the processing of death 
penalty cases had resulted in excessive delay.  The 
Commission found that the average time between sentence 
and execution for the thirteen defendants executed was 17.2 
years,239 with delays growing worse every year.240 The 
Commission reported, “The delay between sentence and 
execution in California is the longest of any of the death 
penalty states.”241  In 2008, Ronald M. George, then Chief 
Justice of the California Supreme Court labeled the 
California system as “dysfunctional,” a description adopted by 
the Commission.242  The Commission made a number of 
recommendations for ending the excessive delay, but, seven 
years later, none has been adopted. 
In 2014, Judge Carmac Carney, in Jones v. Chappell,243 
 
 236.  Commission Report, supra note 115 at 138. 
 237.  That was the number in 2007.  As of April 4, 2015, the number was 754.  
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Condemned Inmate 
Summary List, available at: http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/docs/
CondemnedInmateSummary.pdf. 
 238.  Commission Report, supra note 115 at 177.  (Separate Statement of 
Commissioners Jon Streeter, Kathleen (Cookie) Ridolfi, Michael Hersek, and 
Michael Laurence) (emphasis in the original). 
 239.  Commission Report, supra note 115 at 122. 
 240.  Commission Report, supra note 115 at 125. 
 241.  Commission Report, supra note 115 at 125. 
 242.  Commission Report, supra note 115 at 114–15. 
 243.  Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
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addressed a challenge to the California death penalty scheme 
based on the arbitrariness of executions.  He found that, for 
those whose challenge to their death sentence was denied at 
every level, the review process was taking an average of 
twenty-five years and the delay was only getting longer.244  As 
a result, Judge Carney found that the overwhelming majority 
of death row inmates whose death sentences were affirmed 
were not executed, but died of natural causes or suicides.245  
As Judge Carney explained, 
Since 1978, when the current death penalty system was 
adopted by the California voters, over 900 people have 
been sentenced to death for their crimes.  Of them, only 13 
have been executed.  For the rest, the dysfunctional 
administration of California’s death penalty system has 
resulted, and will continue to result, in an inordinate and 
unpredictable period of delay preceding their actual 
execution.  Indeed, for most, systemic delay has made 
their execution so unlikely that the death sentence 
carefully and deliberately imposed by the jury has been 
quietly transformed into one no rational jury or legislature 
could ever impose: life in prison, with the remote 
possibility of death. 246 
Judge Carney found that any executions under such a scheme 
would be arbitrary for two reasons.  First, the few defendants 
who ultimately will be executed will not be chosen based on 
the nature of their crimes or their individual culpability, but 
on factors outside the inmate’s control: the speed with which 
the case proceeds through the state’s dysfunctional system 
and the inmate’s age and state of health.247  Second, “[a]s for 
the random few for whom execution does become a reality, 
they will have languished for so long on Death Row that their 
 
 244.  Id. at 1062. 
 245.  Id. at 1054, 1062. 
 246.  Id. at 1053 (emphasis in the original). The decision was reversed by the 
Ninth Circuit, without reaching the merits, on the ground that Jones’s claim 
relied on a new rule of criminal procedure, and, therefore, was barred by Teague 
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Davis v. Jones, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015). In his 
dissent in Gossip v. Gross, ____ U.S. ___ , 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2764–72 (2015), 
Justice Breyer discussed at length the “cruelty” of excessive delay and the 
constitutional questions raised as a result. Of course, he was talking about 
delay in execution son a national level, not the far longer delays produced by 
California’s scheme. 
 247.  See id. at 1062. 
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execution will serve no retributive or deterrent purpose . . .”248 
* * * 
Each of these aspects of the California death penalty 
scheme alone might be, and has been, the basis of Eighth 
Amendment challenges to the scheme, and, taken together, 
the various flaws constitute a powerful argument that 
California’s dysfunctional scheme is unconstitutional.  
However, the argument here is a more modest one, and one 
that was made by Justice Blackmun twenty years ago.249  The 
Supreme Court, in Pulley and later in McCleskey, left open 
the door to reexamining the holding in Pulley about the need 
for comparative proportionality review if presented with an 
extreme case.  California is that extreme case.  There is no 
“genuine narrowing” of the death-eligible class; there are no 
limits on the prosecutor in seeking death and few limits in 
presenting penalty-phase evidence; the jury is not required to 
make any findings as to aggravation and/or mitigation, nor is 
it instructed that any particular burden of proof that must be 
met for a death verdict; and meaningful review by the trial 
judge was all but abandoned more than two decades ago.  The 
scheme produces arbitrary death sentences and—because of 
the excessive delays brought about by the overproduction of 
death sentences—arbitrary executions. In sum, the scheme is 
so devoid of checks on arbitrariness that comparative 
proportionality review should be constitutionally required.250 
 
 248.  Id. at 1053. In his dissent in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2764–72 
(2015), Justice Breyer discussed at length the “cruelty” of excessive delay and 
the constitutional questions raised as a result.  Of course he was talking about 
delay in executions on a national level, not the far longer delays produced by 
California’s scheme. 
 249.  Speaking of the California death penalty scheme, he said: “As litigation 
exposes the failure of [the narrowing] factors to guide the jury in making 
principled distinctions, the Court will be well advised to reevaluate its decision 
in Pulley v. Harris. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 995 (1994) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
 250.  Of course, comparative proportionality review is no panacea.  Studies of 
comparative proportionality review in other states reveal that such review can 
be applied in a manner that is superficial and ineffectual.  See William W. Berry 
III, Ending the Death Lottery: A Case Study of Ohio’s Broken Proportionality 
Review, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 67 (2015); Bidish J. Sarma , Robert J. Smith & Ben G. 
Cohen, Struck by Lightning: Walker v. Georgia and Louisiana’s Proportionality 
Review of Death Sentences, 37 S.U.L. L. REV. 65 (2009); Timothy V. Kaufman-
Osborn, Capital Punishment, Proportionality Review, and Claims of Fairness 
(With Lessons from Washington State), 79 WASH. L. REV. 775 (2004). 
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IV. INDIVIDUAL PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW AND THE 
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT 
When a court eschews comparative proportionality 
review and limits itself to individual proportionality review, 
as has the California Supreme Court, the risk is that the 
determination in any individual case will reflect nothing more 
than the untethered subjective views of the justices as to the 
heinousness of the crime or the weight of the mitigation.  In 
that case, individual proportionality review will simply add 
another level of arbitrariness to the state’s death penalty 
scheme.  Section A addresses how the California Supreme 
Court might make individual proportionality review 
meaningful.  Section B describes the actual practice of the 
court. 
A. Meaningful Individual Proportionality Review 
A court approaching individual proportionality review of 
course starts with a presumption that the death verdict 
rendered by the jury and approved by the trial judge is 
proportional.  At the same time, the court must recognize that 
aberrant results are possible because the jury sat on a single 
case and had no reference point for its decision that the 
defendant was the “worst of the worst,” and most trial judges 
will have seen no more than a few death cases in the course of 
a career.251 
If individual proportionality review is to serve its purpose 
of reducing the risk of arbitrariness, the court cannot 
approach each case as an ad hoc decision.  Rather, while each 
decision will ultimately turn on particular facts, the court 
can, and should, develop standards for its review.  Of 
necessity, the court will focus primarily on the aggravating 
factors in the case, as studies have established that the 
statutory aggravating factors play the major role in a death 
sentencing decision.252  The effect of mitigating evidence is, of 
 
 251.  In California, the risk of an aberrant decision by a jury is increased by 
the fact of overbroad death-eligibility.  When jurors find a special circumstance, 
making a defendant death-eligible, they may be misled into voting for death on 
the assumption that the voters, on behalf of the community, have already 
determined that the defendant before them is among the “worst of the worst.”  
They have no way of knowing that the voters have so labeled virtually all first 
degree murderers. 
 252.  See, e.g., David C. Baldus, et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in 
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its nature, less predictable, making it more difficult to 
develop standards for categorizing such evidence and judging 
its effect.  One source for developing standards for individual 
proportionality review is the general understandings we 
share regarding the relative culpability of murderers.  For 
example, we know that an intentional killing is “worse” than 
an unintentional killing. 
Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the 
more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious 
is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to 
be punished.253 
We also know that the actual killer is deemed to be “worse” 
than a non-killing accomplice.254  And, of course, it is “worse” 
to do more harm, so intentionally killing more than one 
person is “worse” than killing one person. 
However, these general propositions will only take the 
California Supreme Court so far in developing standards for 
individual proportionality review.  The challenge for the court 
will be to do what the voters failed to do in adopting and 
amending the Briggs Initiative: decide which types of first-
degree murder are among “the worst of crimes,” for which the 
death penalty might be imposed,255 and which are not.  On a 
national level, the current best thinking about what are the 
 
the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the 
Nebraska Experience (1973–1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 548–49 (2002). 
 253.  Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987).  See also Kennedy v. 
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 438 (2008) (twice suggesting that the death penalty 
should be applied only in the case of intentional murders).  These decisions call 
into question the constitutionality of the rule in California and four other states 
allowing the imposition of the death-penalty for felony-murder simpliciter (i.e., 
for what may be a negligent or even accidental killing). See Shatz, supra note 94 
at 752–68 (arguing that the rule does not meet contemporary standards because 
so few states employ it and that imposing the death penalty on those who kill 
negligently or accidentally does not serve deterrence or retribution).  At the very 
least, a California court reviewing a death sentence based on felony-murder 
simpliciter ought to weigh heavily against proportionality the prosecution’s 
failure to prove mens rea. 
 254.  See Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (testimony about who shot the 
victim was “highly relevant to a critical issue in the punishment phase of the 
trial”).  The one exception to this general rule might be for contract killings, 
where the party planning the killing and paying the money may be thought to 
be just as culpable as the actual killer.  In the Statewide Study, the only 
defendant sentenced to death as an aider and abettor in a single victim case had 
hired a “hitman” to kill his fiancée for insurance money.  Case #354. 
 255.  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 457 (2008). 
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most aggravated types of murder might be reflected in the 
recent reports of three state commissions.256  The most 
ambitious set of reform recommendations is contained in the 
report of Massachusetts’ Council on Capital Punishment, 
issued as a result of Governor Mitt Romney’s call to 
reintroduce the death penalty in Massachusetts.257 The 
recommendations would have limited the death penalty to six 
types of premeditated murder, summarized as follows: (1) 
committed as an act political terrorism; (2) committed to 
interfere with the criminal justice system; (3) the defendant 
intentionally tortured the victim; (4) multiple murders; (5) 
prior first degree murder; (6) the defendant was under a 
sentence of life without possibility of parole.258  Prior to the 
abolition of the death penalty in Illinois, the Illinois 
Governor’s Commission adopted the recommendations of the 
bi-partisan Constitution Project and recommended reducing 
the number of death-eligibility factors to five, summarized as 
follows: (1) murder of a peace officer or firefighter; (2) murder 
at a correctional institution; (3) multiple murder; (4) 
intentional murder with torture; (5) when the defendant is 
being investigated for, or has been charged with, a felony-
murder, murder of anyone involved in the investigation or 
prosecution.259  Recently, the Ohio Joint Task Force issued a 
report with fifty-six recommendations for reform of the Ohio 
death penalty, among which was the recommendation to 
eliminate felony-murder as a basis for death-eligibility 
because: 
[P]rosecutors and juries overwhelmingly do not find felony 
 
 256.  See Joint Task Force to Review the Administration of Ohio’s Death 
Penalty, Final Report & Recommendations (2014), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/deathPenalty/resources/finalReport.p
df; Symposium, Toward a Model Death Penalty Code: The Massachusetts 
Governor’s Council Report, 80 IND. L.J. 1 (2005); Report of the Governor’s 
Commission on Capital Punishment (Illinois) (2002), available at 
http://illinoismurderindictments.law.northwestern.edu/docs/Illinois_Moratoriu
m_Commission_complete-report.pdf. 
 257.  Symposium, Toward a Model Death Penalty Code: The Massachusetts 
Governor’s Council Report, 80 IND. L.J. 1 (2005). 
 258.  Id. at 4–6. 
 259.  Report of the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment (Illinois) 
67–68 (2002), available at http://www.state.il.us/defender/report/complete_
report.pdf.  See The Constitution Project, Mandatory Justice: The Death Penalty 
Revisited, pp. xxiv–xxv (2001; 2005 Update), available at http://www.
constitutionproject.org/manage/file/30.pdf. 
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murder to be the worst of the worst murders, further 
finding that such specifications result in death verdicts 7% 
of the time or less when charged as a death penalty case, 
and further finding that removal of these specifications 
will reduce the race disparity of the death penalty . . .”260 
Legal scholars have also proposed lists of the most 
aggravated murders based on their empirical analysis of 
prosecutors’ and juries’ behaviors.  David Baldus listed six 
types of murder as most aggravated: “multiple killings, 
defendants with prior murder convictions, contract killings, 
police victim cases, extreme torture, and sexual assaults with 
particular violence and terror.”261  David McCord offered a list 
of nine “most aggravating factors”: additional murder, sexual 
assault, murder to revenge official acts, murder for insurance, 
etc. motive, torture, murder by a prisoner or escapee, murder 
in a penal institution, murder for hire, terrorist motive.262  
For a California court, what is most significant about all of 
these attempts to describe the most aggravated murders is 
that none of them include the two most commonly occurring 
types of death-eligible murders in California: robbery-
murders and gang-murders.  In fact, all of the proposals 
would eliminate felony-murder entirely as a basis for death-
eligibility. 
The California Supreme Court should also look to the 
California-specific empirical studies that reveal California 
prosecutors’ and jurors’ views about what kinds of murders 
are most death-worthy.  Consideration of state-specific 
empirical evidence, of course, amounts to “comparative 
 
 260.  Joint Task Force to Review the Administration of Ohio’s Death Penalty, 
Final Report & Recommendations 14 (2014), available at http://www.
supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/deathPenalty/resources/finalReport.pdf 
 261.  David Baldus, When Symbols Clash: Reflections on the Future of the 
Comparative Proportionality Review of Death Sentences, 26 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1582, 1605 (1996). 
 262.  David McCord, Lightning Still Strikes, 71 BROOKLYN L. REV. 798, 834–
35 (2005). Professor McCord analyzed 583 murder cases nationwide in 2004 (the 
middle year of the period covered by the Statewide Study) by means of an 
aggravation scale based on “depravity points.”  It was this study that Justice 
Thomas cited disdainfully in the course of voicing his objections to the use of 
empirical evidence in the context of constitutional adjudication: “[T] he results 
of these studies are inherently unreliable because they purport to control for 
egregiousness by quantifying moral depravity in a process that is itself 
arbitrary, not to mention dehumanizing.” Glossip v. Gross, S.Ct. 2726, 2752 
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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proportionality review lite,” substituting for the court’s own 
review of all death-eligible cases the snapshots of sentencing 
taken by researchers.  What the court would find in these 
studies is that the outcomes in California roughly mirror the 
opinions of the commissions and legal scholars as to 
“egregiousness,” except that California prosecutors and jurors 
rank rape-murder as among the most death-worthy types of 
murder.  As set out above,263 the Statewide Study reveals that 
the two most aggravated types of death-eligible murders in 
California are: multiple murders (including prior murder by 
the defendant) and rape-murders, but with rape-murder seen 
as far more egregious.264  The two earlier California studies 
also show multiple-murder and rape-murder to be the most 
egregious types of murder, but with roughly equivalent death-
sentence rates.  Again, as noted above,265 the Statewide Study 
establishes that, at the other end of the scale, robbery-murder 
and gang-murder, far and away the most common types of 
death-eligible murders, are not considered to be egregious.  In 
fact, the death-sentence rates for these two types of murder 
(robbery-murder 1.6%; gang-murder 0.0%) are so low as to 
create a presumption that any death sentence for such a 
murder is disproportionate. 
Yet another source of information that might be highly 
relevant to the California Supreme Court’s individual 
proportionality review is the prosecutors’ and juries’ 
treatment of a defendant’s accomplices.266  The court’s refusal 
to engage in such comparative intracase proportionality 
review is both unexplained and inexplicable, particularly in 
light of the fact that the court engaged in just such 
comparative review in Dillon, the court’s leading case on 
proportionality review.  The differential treatment of the 
defendant and his accomplices, especially when the 
accomplices are also convicted of first-degree murder on the 
same facts, might suggest that the prosecutor (if she did not 
 
 263.  See supra, text accompanying notes 197–202. 
 264.  Some other less frequently occurring types of murder, e.g. police officer 
killings, may also be considered highly aggravated, but the data is insufficient 
to confirm that hypothesis. 
 265.  See supra, text accompanying notes 197–202. 
 266.  The United States Supreme Court has assumed that evidence of such 
differential treatment is relevant mitigating evidence.  See Parker v. Dugger, 
498 U.S. at 315–16, 318. 
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seek death) or the jury (if they did not impose death) did not 
see the murder itself as among the “worse crimes.”  Of course, 
there may be other explanations for the different treatment—
for example, the roles played by the parties in committing the 
murder or their different character and records—but the 
court conducting a meaningful review should at least address 
the issue.  The need to address the issue is especially strong 
when the prosecutor takes inconsistent positions in the 
separate trials of co-defendants.  To return to the Allison case 
discussed earlier,267 the fact that the prosecutor himself, the 
person most familiar with the facts, did not know whether 
Allison was the principal in the killing (as he argued at 
Allison’s trial) or Bonner was the triggerman (as he had 
argued at Bonner’s trial), should weigh heavily in the court’s 
proportionality analysis. 
Finally, the California Supreme Court, in its 
proportionality review, ought to consider what courts in many 
other states are expressly required to consider by statute: 
whether the particular death sentence might have been 
influenced by illegitimate factors.268  On a national level, 
numerous studies have found race, gender and geographic 
disparities in the administration of the death penalty, and 
these same disparities have been found in California.269  In 
cases consistent with such documented sentencing 
disparities, the court should acknowledge the existence of the 
disparities and explicitly address whether any illegitimate 
factors may have played a role in the prosecutor’s decision to 
charge death and the jury’s decision to impose it. 
To illustrate how this approach might be applied, 
consider the death sentence cases from the Statewide Study.  
In thirty-eight of the fifty-five death sentence cases, the 
prosecution proved multiple murder or a rape-murder, the 
two most aggravating factors in California.  Four other cases 
involved the murder of a peace officer, which might also be a 
highly aggravating factor.270  So, in fourty-two of the fifty-five 
 
 267.  See supra, text accompanying notes 164–67. 
 268.  See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann., § 17-10-35(c)(1) (Supreme Court to determine 
whether death sentence “imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or 
any other arbitrary factor”); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105(3)(a) (same); 42 
Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(h)(3)(i). 
 269.  See supra at Part III.C. 
 270.  There were too few peace officer killings in the study to validate this 
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cases, the initial presumption in favor of proportionality is 
only confirmed by the facts of the murder(s).  However, what 
of the other thirteen cases?  Take two of the cases, one a 
robbery-murder case,271 and the other a gang-murder case.272 
In the robbery-murder case, the defendant (on parole 
from the Youth Authority) and a co-defendant, both nineteen-
year-old African-American men with prior felony records, 
went to the apartment of two drug dealers they knew, seeking 
to acquire a gun.  One of the dealers was not home, and the 
defendant and co-defendant decided to rob the other, a 
twenty-year-old woman.  When she resisted, the two stabbed 
and strangled her and stole a gun, money and other items.  
Apparently the murder was unplanned because the two did 
not bring a weapon to the encounter.  Given that, in the 
study, murders such as this one—unaggravated by additional 
homicide victims, sexual assault, torture or other non-theft 
felonies—resulted in a death sentence less than 1.6% of the 
time, there ought to be no presumption that this death 
sentence is proportional.  In fact, consistent with Furman, 
there ought to be a strong presumption that the sentence is 
arbitrary.  In Furman, Justice Brennan, speaking of a death 
sentence rate of 15–20%, said: 
When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial 
number of the cases in which it is legally available, the 
conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted 
arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery 
system.273 
If a death sentence rate of 15–20% smacks of a lottery system, 
what would Justice Brennan have said about a scheme that 
imposes the death penalty less than 2% of the time?  The 
 
assumption. 
 271.  People v. Winbush, No. 128408B (Alameda Co.); See People v. 
Patterson, 2005 WL 2716538 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 272.  People v. Mataele, No. 00NF347 (Orange Co.); See People v. Lee, 2008 
WL 4527793 (Ct. App. 2008).  Although the defendant was not made death-
eligible on the basis of the gang-murder special circumstance (which was 
enacted in 2000, three years after the murder), the case was tried by the 
prosecution as a gang case, with testimony from a police gang expert that the 
murder and a contemporaneous attempted murder were for the benefit of a 
gang.  The defendant was made death-eligible by the lying in wait special 
circumstance (CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(15)), which, along with the “drive-
by” shooting special circumstance (CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(21)), are 
frequently proved in gang cases. 
 273.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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defendant did have a prior felony record as a juvenile, but 
that would not go far toward explaining the result because, in 
the study, more than half of the death-eligible defendants had 
a prior felony record.  The reviewing court should also take 
into account that the co-defendant, who participated fully in 
the killing, whose subsequent armed robbery led to his arrest 
and that of the defendant, and who was found in possession of 
the robbery proceeds, was not sentenced to death.  Finally, 
the court should consider the possibility that the death 
sentence was influenced by the defendant’s and victim’s race 
and gender, found to be powerful explanatory factors for 
death sentences in numerous empirical studies, beginning 
with the Baldus study in Georgia.274 
The gang-murder case involved a falling out among 
thieves.  The defendant and the murder victim were members 
of different street gangs, and they and other gang members 
from the two gangs had been working together committing 
various theft and drug crimes in Los Angeles County.  As a 
result of the falling out, the defendant and at least three 
others decided to kill the victim and his roommate.  The 
defendant and an accomplice lured the intended victims to a 
parking lot in Orange County where the other accomplices 
were waiting, and both the victim and roommate were shot, 
probably by the defendant.  The victim died, and the 
roommate survived.  Again, a meaningful proportionality 
analysis has to begin with an awareness of how rare a death 
sentence is for this kind of killing.  In the study, this was the 
only gang killing of its kind where the defendant was 
sentenced to death.275  Was there anything extraordinary 
about this murder to distinguish this defendant from the 278 
other defendants who committed similar first-degree murders 
for the benefit of a gang but were not sentenced to death?  
There were three factors that might be thought to be 
additional aggravation in this case: (1) the defendant had a 
felony record; (2) the murder was planned, rather than 
spontaneous; and (3) the defendant attempted to murder a 
second victim.  As noted above, the defendant’s felony record 
 
 274.  See Shatz & Dalton, supra note 178 at 1246–53 (describing race and 
gender studies). 
 275.  Six other defendants who committed gang-murders during this period 
were sentenced to death, but five of the six committed multiple murders, and 
the sixth killed a police officer to effect an escape. 
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does not distinguish this case from majority of cases in the 
study.  Nor does the fact that the murder was planned.  All 
gang-murders qualifying for the death penalty are 
intentional, and most are first-degree murders because they 
are premeditated.276  The fact of the additional attempted 
murder plainly is an aggravating factor, but not as 
aggravating as at first it might appear.  In the study, there 
were thirty-one gang-murder cases where the defendants 
actually killed two victims, and only one was sentenced to 
death (3.2%).  Again, as in the robbery-murder case, the court 
should also consider the outcomes for defendant’s 
accomplices, all of whom were death-eligible: one was not 
convicted of murder; another entered a plea for a life 
sentence; and the third, a co-defendant at the defendant’s 
trial, who was armed and who was a principal in at least the 
attempted murder, also received a life sentence.  Finally, the 
court should consider a possible explanatory factor for this 
unique death sentence that has nothing to do with the 
circumstances of the crime or the character of the defendant.  
Although the sequence of events that led to the murder began 
in Los Angeles County, the murder took place in Orange 
County, a “high death” county.  In the 1990s, the Orange 
County death sentence ratio (death sentences to homicides) 
was almost three times that of Los Angeles County,277 and, in 
the Statewide Study, the death sentence rate (death 
sentences per death-eligible defendants) was two-and-a-half 
times that of Los Angeles County. 
The above discussion of these two cases is not an 
argument that the death sentences in these cases were 
disproportionate—the sentencing juries may have heard 
evidence indicating the crimes or the defendants were “worse” 
than might appear from the probation reports and appellate 
opinions.  Rather, the point is to suggest what meaningful 
review might look like.  It would start with the court 
acknowledging that robbery-murders and gang-murders are 
not thought to be aggravated murders, and, in California, the 
imposition of the death penalty for such murders is 
 
 276.  The exception is for drive-by shootings—an intentional killing by 
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle is first degree murder without proof 
of premeditation.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 
 277.  Pierce & Radelet, supra note 228 at 27. 
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exceedingly rare.  The rarity of the death sentences should 
create a presumption that they are disproportionate, and the 
court would then examine the factors that might account for 
such an unusual result.  This examination would involve 
consideration of why the prosecutor did not seek, or the jury 
did not impose, a death sentence on the defendant’s 
accomplices.  And it would include consideration of the 
illegitimate factors (race, gender, geography) that might 
account for the result.  Unfortunately, the California 
Supreme Court has not addressed proportionality review with 
anything approaching this level of care. 
B. Individual Proportionality Review in the California 
Supreme Court 
Other than its statements to the effect that meaningful 
appellate review of death sentences is required by the Eighth 
Amendment to “ ‘ rationally distinguish between those 
individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction and 
those for whom it is not,’ ” 278 and its holding in Parker that 
such review must “consider the defendant’s actual record,” 
i.e., the character of the defendant in addition to the 
circumstances of the crime,279 the Supreme Court has not 
described the constitutionally required individual 
proportionality review.  However, by any measure, the 
sentence review by the California Supreme Court comes up 
short. 
1. The Court’s “Shock the Conscience” Standard for 
Reviewing Death Sentences 
The “shock the conscience” standard for finding a death 
sentence disproportionate creates an extraordinarily high bar 
for granting relief.280  The United States Supreme Court has 
never used such a test in its Eighth Amendment review of 
death sentences, or even in its review of prison sentences.281  
Of the other 31 death penalty states, in only two—Oklahoma 
 
 278.  Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 321 (1991) (quoting Spaziano v. 
Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 (1984)). 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  In challenges to sentences under the California Constitution, “[f]indings 
of disproportionality have occurred with exquisite rarity in the case law.” People 
v. Weddle, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 714, 718 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 281.  See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20–24 (2003). 
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and Utah—does the state supreme court apply such a 
stringent standard in its review of death sentences.282 
 Review under a “shock the conscience” standard is 
almost certainly not what the Supreme Court had in mind 
when it held that the Eighth Amendment required 
meaningful appellate review.  The “shock the conscience” 
standard is taken from the Supreme Court’s substantive due 
process cases,283 and the California court’s use of a due 
process standard to fulfill its Eighth Amendment 
responsibility is inconsistent with Furman itself.  The lesson 
of Furman is that, in the context of the death penalty, the 
Eighth Amendment requires more of a state sentencing 
scheme than that it satisfy substantive due process.  Just a 
year prior to its decision in Furman, the Court had upheld 
state death penalty schemes against a substantive due 
process challenge,284 but held in Furman that the schemes, 
which presumably satisfied substantive due process, still 
created too great a risk of arbitrariness to satisfy the Eighth 
Amendment.285  The Supreme Court requires appellate review 
of death sentences in order to bring about reasonable 
 
 282.  See Battenfield v. State, 816 P.2d 555, 563–64 (Okl.Cr., 1991); State v. 
Lafferty, 20 P.3d 342, 365 (2001).  The Washington Supreme Court, in State v. 
Elmore, 985 P.2d 289, 324 (Wash. 1999), after conducting a thorough intercase 
proportionality review of a death sentence, stated: “[W]e cannot say Elmore’s 
death sentence shocks the conscience of this Court. Elmore’s death sentence is 
neither excessive nor disproportionate to other cases in which the death penalty 
has been imposed.”  However, the phrase “shocks the conscience” appears to be 
an off-hand remark rather than a statement of the standard of review since the 
phrase appears in no other death penalty case reviewed by that court.  See, e.g., 
State v. Cross, 132 P.3d 80 (Wash. 2006). 
 283.  That standard was first used in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 
172–73 (1952), a case where the Court found that the forced pumping of a 
suspect’s stomach violated due process, and it has been applied in subsequent 
due process cases.  See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–50 
(1998) (discussing cases). 
 284.  See generally McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
 285.  See supra note 3. See also Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion in 
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) where he clearly differentiates between 
a broader Eighth Amendment claim and a narrower due process claim.  At issue 
in Herrera was whether the defendant’s assertion of “actual innocence” stated a 
cognizable claim for purposes of federal habeas corpus.  Only after first arguing 
that the defendant had stated an Eighth Amendment claim for relief did Justice 
Blackmun turn to the due process clause and argue the execution of an innocent 
man would “shock the conscience.” Id. at 435–36.  Justice Scalia responded by 
questioning “the usefulness of ‘conscience shocking’ as a legal test.” Id. at 428 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
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consistency in the administration of the death penalty, to 
weed out aberrant decisions by particular prosecutors and 
juries.  That purpose requires that the state courts develop 
standards for evaluating aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, a far cry from the California court’s subjective 
“shocks the conscience” approach. 
2. The Court’s Failure to Review Most Death 
Sentences 
As noted above, the California Supreme Court does not 
routinely engage in proportionality review of death sentences.  
The court apparently feels obliged to conduct such review 
only at the request of the defendant; however, without 
explanation, it sometimes conducts such review even absent a 
request.286  Thus, the decision whether to review the death 
sentence itself appears to be arbitrary.  Perhaps because of 
the unlikeliness of success under the court’s standard, most 
defendants sentenced to death do not seek review of the 
sentence itself.  Through 2014, the court had reviewed 593 
death penalty cases on direct appeal under the 1978 death 
penalty law.  In those 593 cases, the court engaged in even 
cursory proportionality review in only 164 cases not otherwise 
reversed or remanded, and that count includes both 
categorical proportionality challenges, e.g., to death sentences 
based on felony-murder simpliciter,287 and individual case 
review.  California is one of a distinct minority of states 
where the supreme court fails to review the appropriateness 
of all death sentences.288  The fact that the California 
Supreme Court does not review all death sentences, itself, 
probably does not raise a constitutional question.  The 
Supreme Court, in Pulley, did not seem concerned by the 
California court’s practice, making no mention of the fact that 
Pulley had not sought, and was not accorded, proportionality 
 
 286.  See People v. Jones, 247 P.3d 82, 109 n.7 (2011) (sentence reviewed 
without request); People v. Parson, 187 P.3d 1, 27 (2008) (same). 
 287.  See People v. Chism, 324 P.3d 183, 232 (2014); People v. Watkins, 290 
P.3d 364, 390 (2012). 
 288.  There appear to be only four others: Arkansas (e.g., Taylor v. State, 372 
S.W.3d 769 (2010); Oregon (e.g., State v. Haugen, 243 P.3d 31 (2010)); 
Pennsylvania (e.g., Commonwealth v. Perez, 93 A.3d 829 (2014)); and Texas 
(e.g., Cade v. State, 2015 WL 832421 (2015)).  The position of the Supreme 
Court in Colorado and Kansas is unclear. 
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review.  However, if the purpose of meaningful appellate 
review is not to give relief to a particular defendant, but to 
ensure that scheme as whole does not operate in an arbitrary 
fashion, it would seem that purpose cannot be served if the 
court only reviews a relatively small portion of the death 
sentences. 
3. The Quality of the Court’s Review When it Occurs 
The California Supreme Court has described its review 
as follows: 
To determine whether a sentence is cruel or unusual as 
applied to a particular defendant, a reviewing court must 
examine the circumstances of the offense, including its 
motive, the extent of the defendant’s involvement in the 
crime, the manner in which the crime was committed, and 
the consequences of the defendant’s acts. The court must 
also consider the personal characteristics of the defendant, 
including age, prior criminality, and mental 
capabilities.289 
In fact, the court rarely conducts such a searching review of a 
death sentence.  In most cases, the sentence review consists 
of a brief paragraph, or sometimes just a single sentence.  
Consider the following examples: 
Defendant contends that we should . . . consider whether 
the death penalty is cruel or unusual punishment as 
applied to him.  He offers, however, no persuasive analysis 
of the facts to support this claim.290   
To the extent defendant contends his sentence must be 
reduced under the reasoning of Dillon, we find no 
disproportionality on this record and therefore reject the 
contention.291  
Defendant makes an intracase proportionality claim, 
arguing his sentence is grossly disproportionate to his 
offense, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, due to his asserted mental 
illness. Although a death sentence is subject to such 
review, the record fails to support the factual premise of 
 
 289.  People v. Steele, 47 P.3d 225, 250 (Cal. 2002) (quoting People v. Hines, 
938 P.2d 388, 443 (Cal. 1997). 
 290.  People v. Thompson, 753 P.2d 37, 73 (Cal. 1988) (citations omitted). 
 291.  People v. Marshall, 919 P.2d 1280, 1318 (Cal. 1996). 
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his argument.292   
Even where the court does spend more time on the issue, 
the review falls short of that promised.  For example, in 
People v. Adcox,293 where the defendant and another killed 
the victim in the course of a robbery and where, at trial, the 
defendant testified (with some corroboration) that he was not 
the “triggerman” and, at the penalty phase, presented four 
mitigation witnesses, the court had this to say: 
Defendant was convicted on extremely strong evidence 
that he deliberately, intentionally, and with 
premeditation, committed a senseless, pitiless murder of 
an unwitting victim who was unknown to him. The 
murder occurred in the course of a calculated plan to rob 
the victim. After the crimes, defendant personally 
removed money from the victim’s wallet, devised a plan to 
dispose of his vehicle, and removed its stereo cassette 
player, which he gave away to some friends. In the penalty 
phase the jury was fully apprised of all the factors 
properly bearing upon whether defendant was eligible for, 
and deserved, the death penalty. There was, of course, 
defendant’s relative youth. However nothing in the prior 
decisions of this court, or of the federal courts, suggests 
that his punishment is constitutionally disproportionate to 
“the offense” or “the offender.”294 
In People v. Lang,295 a subsequent case involving another 
single-victim robbery-murder, where the circumstances of the 
killing were disputed and the defendant offered some 
mitigation evidence by way of his trial testimony and through 
a correctional officer at the penalty phase, the court said: 
To the extent defendant contends the penalty of death is 
disproportionate to his individual culpability, we reject the 
contention on its merits. Defendant murdered a stranger 
to obtain his possessions, shooting him five times and 
stripping the body of valuables. Defendant’s claim of 
 
 292.  People v. Koontz, 46 P.3d 335, 370–71 n.10 (Cal. 2002) (citation 
omitted). 
 293.  People v. Adcox, 763 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1988). 
 294.  Id. 946.  The court’s emphasis on the fact that the murder was 
premeditated seems a bit disingenuous since the court has repeatedly upheld 
robbery-murder death sentences against disproportionality challenges where 
the killing was assumed to be unintentional, or even wholly accidental.  See, 
e.g., People v. Chism, 324 P.3d 183, 232 (2014); People v. Watkins, 290 P.3d 364, 
390–91 (2012). 
 295.  People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627 (Cal. 1989). 
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provocation was found wanting by both the jury and the 
trial court and, as the trial court remarked in denying the 
automatic motion to modify penalty, defendant’s conduct 
exhibited “a high degree of cruelty and callousness.”296 
Two facts are striking about the court’s sentence review in 
these two cases.  First, the court seems to believe that single-
victim robbery-murders are highly aggravated murders.  
Despite the court’s florid language—”senseless, pitiless 
murder of an unwitting victim” (Adcox); “high degree of 
cruelty and callousness” (Lang)—such murders are not 
considered highly aggravated.  Such murders are 
commonplace, and empirical studies consistently demonstrate 
that, in those states that make robbery-murder a death-
eligible crime, such murders are among the least likely to 
result in a death sentence.297  The same is clearly true in 
California.298  Second, despite the fact both defendants had 
introduced some mitigation evidence, the court did not 
discuss it. 
Finally, even when the court acknowledges that the 
defendant’s crime is not among the worst, the court’s review 
is perfunctory.  For example, in People v. Hughes,299 a case 
where the defendant offered extensive evidence in mitigation, 
the court’s entire analysis was as follows: 
Defendant also asserts that his sentence is so 
disproportionate to his personal culpability as to “shock 
the conscience” or “offend fundamental notions of human 
dignity.” Even though defendant may not be among the 
most heinous of murderers and his crimes may not be as 
abominable as some of the others we have reviewed, based 
upon the facts presented we cannot conclude that the 
sentence he received “is disproportionate to defendant’s 
‘personal responsibility and moral guilt.’ ” 300 
4. The Court’s Record 
The appeal outcomes themselves demonstrate the 
absence of meaningful review.  In the 593 cases reviewed by 
the California Supreme Court, the court affirmed the death 
 
 296.  Id. at 663 (citations omitted). 
 297.  See Shatz, supra note 94 at 739–45. 
 298.  See supra at Part III.A. 
 299.  People v. Hughes, 39 P.3d 432 (Cal. 2002). 
 300.  Id. at 510–11 (citations and footnote omitted). 
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sentence in 508 (86%) of the cases.301  The court reversed, or 
remanded for further fact-finding, for guilt phase legal error, 
in 44 cases (7%) and for penalty phase legal error, in 41 cases 
(7%).  The following chart sets out the appeal outcomes over 
time. 
 
 
 
 Thus, the court has occasionally reversed for guilt or 
penalty phase legal error,302 but, not surprisingly given the 
court’s extraordinarily high bar for relief, its failure to review 
most sentences and its often cursory treatment of those it 
does review, the court never found a death sentence to be 
disproportionate.303  To borrow a term from the Supreme 
 
 301.  In some of these cases, the court reversed one or more counts or special 
circumstances, but affirmed the death judgment.  See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 
826 P.2d 274 (Cal. 1992) (reversing one of two murders and the multiple murder 
special circumstance); People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1990) (reversing 
two of four special circumstances). 
 302.  Most of the reversals or remands occurred in the first decade of review 
under the 1978 Law.  Since 1991, the Supreme Court has affirmed 93% of the 
death judgments. 
 303.   In this respect only, California is not an outlier.  In the states with at 
least 100 death sentences since Furman (seventeen states), only a bare majority 
of the state high courts have overturned a death sentence on the ground that it 
was disproportionate.  Those states are: Arizona (see State v. Stevens, 764 P.2d 
1
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Court, this “inexorable zero”304 establishes that, in plain 
violation of the Eighth Amendment, the court simply does not 
engage in appellate review (meaningful or otherwise) of death 
sentences. 
CONCLUSION 
 The Supreme Court’s remedy for the unconstitutional 
risk of arbitrariness in the administration of the death 
penalty was to require the state legislatures to genuinely 
narrow the definition of the death-eligible class and to require 
the state courts to meaningfully review death sentences in 
order to eliminate aberrant sentences.  This remedy was an 
effort to engage in a form of “cooperative federalism.”305  The 
Court did not tell the legislatures how they were to narrow 
the death-eligible class nor did the Court set out any 
guidelines for how the state courts were to weigh aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances in reviewing death sentences.  
Each state retained a large measure of autonomy: it was free 
to define for itself the “worst of the worst,” so long as the 
definition resulted in “reasonable consistency”306 in the 
administration of the death penalty within the state.  Thus, 
the Court found an innovative middle ground approach 
between the Scylla of dictating to the states substantive 
limits on the death penalty307 and the Charybdis of retreating 
from the field and leaving the death penalty entirely 
 
724 (Ariz. 1988)); Florida (see Crook v. State, 908 So.2d 350 (Fla. 2005)); 
Georgia (see Hall v. State, 244 S.E.2d 833 (Ga. 1978)); Illinois (see People v. 
Blackwell, 665 N.E.2d 782 (Ill. 1996)); Louisiana (see State v. Weiland, 505 
So.2d 702 (La. 1987)); Nevada (see Servin v. State, 32 P.3d 1277 (Nev. 2001)); 
North Carolina (see State v. Kemmerlin, 573 S.E.2d 870 (N.C. 2002)); Ohio (see 
State v. Watson, 572 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1991)); Oklahoma (see Munn v. State, 658 
P.2d 482 (Okla. 1983)). 
 304.  International Broth. of Teamsters v. U.S.  431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 
(1977). 
 305.  This term has generally been used to describe federal-state programs 
created by Congress (see, e.g., Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Family Services v. 
Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 (2002) (Medicaid statute)), but seems aptly applied to 
the Court’s program here. 
 306.  Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982). 
 307.  As the Court has nonetheless done in some recent cases.  See Kennedy 
v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (holding the death penalty for rape of a child 
unconstitutional); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the death 
penalty for juvenile crimes unconstitutional); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002) (holding the death penalty for intellectually disabled defendants 
unconstitutional). 
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unregulated.  This understanding of the Court’s Furman 
jurisprudence is similar to, although less sweeping than, that 
put forward by James Liebman several years ago in his 
exhaustive review of the Court’s death penalty cases.308  
Professor Liebman labeled the Court’s approach “democratic 
experimentalist jurisprudence”309 and argued, in effect, that 
the autonomy given to states to develop standards for a 
proportionate death penalty was only temporary, i.e., that, at 
some point the Supreme Court, informed by the product of 
the states’ efforts, would interpret the Eighth Amendment to 
define a national proportionality standard.310  Professor 
Liebman was effusive in his praise of the Court’s Furman 
approach, variously referring to the Court’s Furman 
jurisprudence as an “ingenious system of delegated 
proportionality,”311 a “brilliant system,”312 an “imaginative 
scheme.”313  And he is right that had the state legislatures 
and state courts accepted the Court’s invitation to participate 
in a regime of shared responsibility and had the Supreme 
Court monitored the states’ performance, the Furman 
problem, arbitrary administration of the death penalty might 
have been substantially ameliorated. 
 However, the California voters and the California 
Supreme Court declined the Court’s invitation and flouted the 
Court’s requirements.  Far from narrowing the death-eligible 
class, the voters, in 1978, adopted the broadest death penalty 
scheme in the country—with the express intent, noted above, 
to make the death penalty applicable to all murderers—and 
 
 308. See Liebman, supra, note 15. 
 309. Liebman, supra, note 15 at 113. 
 310. See Liebman, supra, note 15 at 115–16. Recently, Liebman’s democratic 
experimentalist jurisprudence thesis received some support from the Court’s 
decision in another area of death penalty law.  At issue in Hall v. Florida, 134 
S.Ct. 1986 (2014), was the state’s implementation of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002), forbidding the execution of persons with intellectual disability.  The 
Court described the respective roles of the Supreme Court and the states in 
terms similar to Liebman’s: 
[T]he States play a critical role in advancing protections and providing 
the Court with information that contributes to an understanding of 
how intellectual disability should be measured and assessed. But 
Atkins did not give the States unfettered discretion to define the full 
scope of the constitutional protection. 
Hall, 134 S.Ct. at 1998. 
 311.  Liebman, supra note 15 at 113. 
 312.  Liebman, supra note 15 at 121. 
 313.  Liebman, supra note 15 at 122. 
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then broadened that scheme three times.  The California 
Supreme Court, for its part, simply ignored the requirement 
that it engage in review of death sentences and has 
consistently rubber-stamped death judgments no matter what 
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
Although California may be the most extreme case—
combining the broadest death penalty scheme with a 
complete failure to review death sentences—most other death 
penalty states, also have increasingly ignored the two 
Furman requirements.  The politics of the death penalty exert 
powerful pressures on legislatures continually to expand the 
death penalty and on elected judges to avoid meaningful 
review of death sentences.  The various death penalty 
schemes are expanded by adding death-eligibility factors.  
Since the initial approval by the Supreme Court of post-
Furman statutes, aggravating factors “have been added to 
capital statutes . . . like Christmas tree ornaments.”314  In 
fact, in each state where the Supreme Court has rejected a 
“failure to narrow” challenge to a death penalty scheme—
Arizona,315 Idaho316 and Louisiana317—the legislature shortly 
thereafter expanded the scheme.318  According to one 
commentator, 
[T]he number and breadth of these aggravating factors 
have expanded over the last few decades, with most states 
listing more than ten factors, such that more than 90% of 
murderers are death eligible in many states.319 
Empirical studies of other states’ death penalty schemes 
have found them to be so broad as to produce a death 
sentence rate far below that in Georgia at the time of 
Furman.320  With regard to meaningful appellate review, 
 
 314.  Jonathan Simon & Christina Spaulding, Tokens of Our Esteem: 
Aggravating Factors in the Era of Deregulated Death Penalties, in Austin Sarat, 
ed., THE KILLING STATE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 
81, 82 (1999). 
 315.  Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
 316.  Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993). 
 317.  Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988). 
 318.  See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(F); Idaho Code § 19-2515; La. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 14:30(A). 
 319.  Chelsea Creo Sharon, The “Most Deserving” of Death: The Narrowing 
Requirement and the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing 
Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 223 (2011). 
 320.  See, e.g., Marceau, Kamin & Foglia, supra, note 17 (Colorado); 
Raymond Paternoster & Robert Brame, An Empirical Analysis of Maryland’s 
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many of the states have backpedaled since the Court’s 
decision in Pulley.  Of the current death penalty states, seven 
that had previously engaged in comparative proportionality 
review abandoned it in favor of less robust review,321 and, in 
three other states where the courts had reversed death 
sentences for disproportionality in the past—Georgia, 
Louisiana and Ohio—the state supreme courts have not found 
a sentence disproportionate in more than two decades. 
In 2008, in Kennedy v. Louisiana,322 Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority, asserted that, starting with Gregg, 
the Court had “developed a foundational jurisprudence” “to 
avoid the death penalty’s arbitrary imposition.”323  In fact, the 
Court did develop a foundational jurisprudence to implement 
Furman—the genuine narrowing and meaningful appellate 
review requirements—but, as the case of California 
demonstrates, the Court’s inattention to those requirements 
since declaring them has permitted the states to disregard 
that jurisprudence.  More than twenty-five years have passed 
since the Court last considered (and rejected) a failure-to-
narrow challenge to a state scheme,324 and it has been almost 
that long since the Court last considered (and upheld) a 
meaningful appellate review challenge.325 Assuming that 
deregulating the death penalty—overturning Furman—is no 
longer a realistic option for the Supreme Court,326 and that 
 
Death Sentencing System with Respect to the Influence of Race and Legal 
Jurisdiction (2003) available at http://www.newsdesk.umd.edu/pdf/finalrep.pdf 
(Maryland); Donohue III, supra note 17 (Connecticut). 
 321.  In five of the states, comparative proportionality review was required 
by statute, and the statutes were amended to remove the requirements.  See 
1994 Idaho Sess. Laws 127; 1985 Nev. Stat. 527; 1985 Okla. Sess. Laws 265; 
1997 Pa. Legis. Serv. 1997-28 (West); 1989 Wyo. Sess. Laws 171.  In two of the 
states where the state supreme court had adopted comparative proportionality 
review, not pursuant to a statutory mandate—Arizona and Arkansas—the 
supreme court reversed field and abandoned the practice.  See State v. Salazar, 
844 P.2d 566, 584 (Ariz. 1992); Williams v. State, 902 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Ark. 
1995). 
 322.  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008). 
 323.  Id. at 440. 
 324.  Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988).  In 1993, the Court did grant 
cert. to consider a “failure-to-narrow” challenge to Tennessee’s scheme, but 
subsequently dismissed cert. as improvidently granted.  See Tennessee v. 
Middlebrooks, 507 U.S. 1028 (granting cert.); Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 510 
U.S. 124 (dismissing cert.). 
 325.  Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991). 
 326.  See Liebman, note 15 at 126. 
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the Court is not prepared to throw up its hands and abolish 
the death penalty, then the Court must enforce Furman, 
which means monitoring the states’ adherence to “genuine 
narrowing” and “meaningful appellate review.”  The lesson 
from California is that the Supreme Court’s “meaningful 
review” of state schemes is long overdue. 
 
